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Abstract
With the growing use of machine learning algorithms in highly consequential domains, the quantification and removal of
bias with respect to protected attributes, such as gender, race, etc., is becoming increasingly important. While quantifying bias is
essential, sometimes the needs of a business (e.g., hiring) may require the use of certain features that are critical in a way that any
bias that can be explained by them might need to be exempted. For instance, in hiring an employee, a standardized test-score
may be a critical feature that should be weighed strongly in the decision even if biased, whereas other features, such as name,
zip code, or reference letters may be used to improve decision-making, but only to the extent that they do not reinforce bias. In
this work, we propose a novel information-theoretic decomposition of the total bias (a quantification inspired from counterfactual
fairness) into a non-exempt component which quantifies the part of the bias that cannot be accounted for by the critical features,
and an exempt component which quantifies the remaining bias. This decomposition is important: it allows one to check if the
bias arose purely due to the critical features (inspired from the business necessity defense of disparate impact law) and also
enables selective removal of the non-exempt component of bias if desired. We arrive at this decomposition through examples
and counterexamples that lead to a set of desirable properties (axioms) that any measure of non-exempt bias should satisfy. We
then demonstrate that our proposed counterfactual measure of non-exempt bias satisfies all of them. Our quantification bridges
ideas of causality, Simpson’s paradox, and a body of work from information theory called Partial Information Decomposition
(PID). We also obtain an impossibility result showing that no observational measure of non-exempt bias can satisfy all of the
desired properties, which leads us to relax our goals and examine alternative observational measures that satisfy only some of
these properties. We then perform case studies to show how one can train models while reducing non-exempt bias.
I. INTRODUCTION
As artificial intelligence becomes ubiquitous, it is important to understand whether a machine-learnt model is unfairly biased
with respect to protected attributes such as gender, race, etc., and if so, how we can engineer fairness into such a model. The
field of fair machine learning provides several measures for fairness [2]–[40], and uses them to reduce bias, e.g., as a regularizer
during training [3], [7]. In several applications, there are some features that are critical in a way that they are required to be
weighed strongly in the decision even if they perpetuate bias. Examples of such critical features include weightlifting ability for
a firefighter’s job, educational qualification for an academic job, coding skills for a software engineering job, merit and seniority
in deciding salary, etc. In an attempt to preserve the importance of the critical features in the decision making, one might
choose to exempt the bias arising from them. On the other hand, racial bias in mortgage lending decisions arising from zip code
(a non-critical feature) [41] or gender bias in automated hiring arising from the word “women’s” in a resume [42] are examples
of non-exempt bias. In this work, our goal is to formalize and quantify the non-exempt bias, i.e., the part of the bias that cannot
be accounted for by the critical features. This quantification is important for two main reasons: (i) it allows one to check if the
bias arose purely due to the critical features (inspired from the “business necessity defense” in the disparate impact law, i.e.,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [43]); and (ii) it enables selective removal of the non-exempt component if desired.
In this work, we assume that the critical features or business necessities are known (similar to [19], [44]; this discussion is
revisited in Section VIII). We let Xc and Xg denote the critical and the non-critical (or general) features, and X denote the
entire set of features. We also denote the protected attribute(s) by Z, the true label by Y , and the model output by Yˆ which is
a function of the entire feature vector X . While we acknowledge that such categorization of features is application-dependent
and might require domain knowledge and ethical evaluation, such exemptions do exist in law. E.g., the US Equal Pay Act [45]
exempts for difference in salary based on gender that can be explained by merit and seniority. Similarly, the US employment
discrimination law [46] contains a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense where bias about protected attributes
may be exempted if the bias is “due to a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or other
reasonable differentials.” For example, weightlifting ability is a critical feature in hiring firefighters so that they are able to carry
fire victims out of a burning building. The feature representing weightlifting ability is therefore required to be weighed strongly
in hiring even if it is correlated with some protected attributes. Similarly, UK employment bias law also allows exemptions
based on the privacy and decency of the people the employer would be dealing with, e.g., staff in a care home [47].
Why should we use the “general” features at all for prediction if they are not critical? The general features can improve
accuracy, or reduce the candidate pool, e.g., if 60% applicants clear a test, but resources are available to interview only 10%.
Not using the general features at all can reduce accuracy, or produce a very large candidate pool. In this work, our proposition is
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University. Author Contacts: S. Dutta (sang-
hamd@andrew.cmu.edu), P. Venkatesh (vpraveen@cmu.edu), P. Mardziel (piotrm@cmu.edu), A. Datta (danupam@cmu.edu), P. Grover (pulkit@cmu.edu).
This work has been presented in part at AAAI 2020 [1].
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
07
98
6v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
4 J
un
 20
20
FAIRNESS UNDER FEATURE EXEMPTIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL AND OBSERVATIONAL MEASURES 2
TABLE I: Observational Measures (MNE) of Non-Exempt Bias (Utility and Limitations)
Desirable Properties Uni(Z : Yˆ | Xc) I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) I(Z; Yˆ | Xc, X′)
1. MNE is equal to total bias (in a counterfactual sense) if Xc = φ and Xg = X . No No No
2. MNE is non-increasing as more features are added to Xc from Xg . Yes No No
3. MNE is 0 (complete exemption) if Xc = X and Xg = φ. Yes Yes Yes
4. No counterfactual causal influence from Z to Yˆ ⇒ MNE = 0. Yes Not Always Not Always
5. MNE detects unique information about Z in Yˆ not in Xc. Yes Yes Not Always
6. MNE detects non-exempt masked bias. No Masked by g(Xc) Masked by g(Xc, X′)
to use both critical and general features in a way that maximizes accuracy (to the extent possible) while preventing non-exempt
bias. For instance (inspired from [43]), to choose a “good” employee, an employer could evaluate standardized test scores and
also reference letters (human-graded performance reviews). All these features are “job-related” in that they have statistical
correlation with the prediction goal, and can help improve the accuracy. However, test-scores, a critical feature, should be
weighed strongly in the decision, even if biased, whereas, reference letters may be used only to the extent that they do not
discriminate.
This work treads a middle ground between two popular measures of fairness that do not use domain knowledge, namely,
statistical parity [2], [3], [10], [35], which enforces the criterion Z ⊥ Yˆ , and equalized odds [4], [10], [35], which enforces
Z ⊥ Yˆ |Y (directly or through practical relaxations). Our selective quantification of non-exempt bias (using domain knowledge
to identify critical features) helps address one of the major criticisms against statistical parity. The criticism is that it can lead
to the selection of unqualified members from the protected group [4], [26], e.g., by disregarding the critical features if they are
correlated with the protected attribute Z. In fact, in our case study in Section VII, we observe that the weight of the critical
feature is significantly reduced in the decision making when one uses statistical parity as a regularizer with the loss function
because the critical feature is correlated with Z. On the other hand, equalized odds suffers from label bias [36], [37], [41], [48],
[49] because it is based on agreement with the true labels. In fact, we will demonstrate through an example (Example 5 in
Section III-C) that if the historic labels themselves reinforce bias from the non-critical features, then even if we obtain a perfect
classifier after training on the historic data, which satisfies equalized odds, it can reinforce undesirable non-exempt bias1.
A. Contributions
Our main contribution in this work is the quantification of non-exempt bias based on a rigorous axiomatic approach. As a
first step towards this quantification, we propose an information-theoretic quantification (see Definition 4 in Section II-B) of the
total bias (exempt and non-exempt) that is 0 if and only if the model is counterfactually fair [18]. Counterfactual fairness [18],
[20] is a causal notion of fairness where the features X , the protected attribute Z and the model output Yˆ are assumed to
be observables in a Structural Causal Model (SCM) (defined formally in Section II; see Definition 2). The model is deemed
counterfactually fair if Z has no counterfactual causal influence on Yˆ , i.e., Yˆ does not change if we are able to vary Z in the
SCM in a manner that other independent latent factors remain constant (defined formally in Section II; see Definition 3).
Interestingly, note that the total bias (in a counterfactual sense) may not exhibit itself entirely in the mutual information
I(Z; Yˆ ), which is the statistically visible information2 about Z in Yˆ , because of “statistical masking effects” (also relates to
Simpson’s paradox [50]). Consider an example inspired from [18], [22], [34] where an expensive housing ad is shown selectively
to high-income people of one race and also to low income people of another race, i.e., Yˆ = Z ⊕G where ⊕ denotes XOR, G
is the income that has no causal influence of Z and G,Z are i.i.d. Bern(1/2). This model is biased against the high-income
people of the second race for whom the ad is relevant, but I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0 here, thus failing to capture this bias. Intuitively, our
quantification of total bias also extends the idea of proxy-use [22] from white-box models3 to black-box models. Proxy-use [22]
examines “white-box” models, i.e., models with clearly defined constituents (e.g., decision trees) and regards a model as having
bias if (i) there is a constituent that has high mutual information about Z (a proxy of Z); and (ii) this constituent also causally
influences the output Yˆ (i.e., varying the constituent while keeping other constituents constant does not change the output). In
this work, the total bias captures the intuitive notion of a virtual constituent or proxy of Z that causally influences the final
output Yˆ (this intuition is revisited to understand Example 2 in Section II-B). For instance, a virtual constituent Z is formed in
the example of masked bias in housing ads that causally influences Yˆ even though I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0.
Next, we quantify the non-exempt part of this total bias, i.e., the part that cannot be explained by the critical features (Xc).
Building on the extension of proxy-use [22] for black-box models as discussed above, we aim to quantify the influence of
a discriminatory virtual constituent or proxy of Z, if formed inside the black-box model, on the model output Yˆ , and that
1Our quantification does not use the true labels for fairness (unlike equalized odds), addressing the criticism in [43] which says that “ [...] often the best
labels for different classifications will be open to debate.”
2This is a quantification of bias inspired from statistical parity which deems a model fair if and only if Yˆ ⊥ Z. Note that, I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0 if and only if
Yˆ ⊥ Z.
3White-box models [22] are the type of models where one can clearly explain how they behave, how they produce predictions and what the influencing
variables or sub-components of the model are, e.g., decision trees, linear regression, etc.
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cannot be attributed entirely to the critical features (this idea is revisited for an intuitive understanding of the examples in
Section II-B.). To quantify this non-exempt bias, we consider toy examples and thought experiments to first arrive at a set of
desirable properties (axioms) that any measure of non-exempt bias should satisfy, and then provide a measure that satisfies
them (see Theorem 1). These desirable properties can be intuitively described as follows. First, if all the features are in the
non-critical set, then the measure should be equal to the total bias since no bias is exempt. For a fixed set of features X and a
fixed model, as more features become categorized as critical, the measure of non-exempt bias should not increase, i.e., it either
decreases or stays the same. Ultimately, if all the features are in the critical set Xc, then we require the measure of non-exempt
bias to be 0 since then the total bias is exempt. The measure should also not avoid false positive conclusions, e.g., it should be
0 if the virtual constituents or proxies of Z cancel each other leading to a final model output that has no counterfactual causal
influence of Z, i.e., the model is counterfactually fair. Next, it is desirable that the measure be non-zero if Yˆ has any “unique”
statistically visible information about Z that is not present in Xc because then that information content is also attributed to Xg .
However, because of statistical masking effects, even if this unique information is 0, there may still be non-exempt masked bias
that needs to be captured, e.g., in the aforementioned example of housing ads (also revisited in Example 3 in Section III-A
where we formally state these properties).
Our proposed measure of non-exempt bias, that satisfies all these desirable properties, is counterfactual in nature, i.e., it
depends on the true SCM, and hence, is not observational4 in general. We also show the theoretical impossibility of any
observational measure in satisfying all the desirable properties together (see Theorem 3). We note that in some applications,
counterfactual measures can be realized or approximated with assumptions on the causal model. However, for more general
use in practical applications, we also propose several observational relaxations of our measure that satisfy only some of these
properties. Nevertheless, we believe that a counterfactual measure and its properties are crucial in understanding the utility and
the limitations of different observational measures and informing which measure to choose in practice (summarized in Table I;
detailed discussion in Section VI).
To summarize, our contributions in this work are as follows:
1. Quantification of Non-Exempt Bias: We propose a novel counterfactual measure of non-exempt bias that captures the
bias that cannot be explained by the critical features. Our quantification attempts to capture the intuitive notion of whether a
discriminatory virtual constituent or proxy [22] of Z is formed inside the black-box model that influences the output Yˆ and
that cannot be attributed entirely to the critical features (Xc). We adopt a rigorous axiomatic approach where we first arrive at
a set of desirable properties that any measure of non-exempt bias should satisfy, and then show that the proposed measure
satisfies them (see Theorem 1). Our quantification leverages a body of work in information theory called Partial Information
Decomposition (PID), as well as, works on counterfactual fairness.
2. Overall Decomposition of Total Bias into Statistically Visible and Masked components: Our quantification finally leads
us to an overall decomposition of the total bias into four non-negative components, namely, exempt and non-exempt statistically
visible bias and exempt and non-exempt masked bias (see Theorem 2). The exempt and non-exempt statistically visible biases
add up to give I(Z; Yˆ ) which is the total statistically visible bias.
3. An Impossibility Result: We show that no purely observational measure of non-exempt bias can satisfy all our desirable
properties (see Theorem 3).
4. Observational Relaxations: Relaxing our requirements, we obtain purely observational measures that satisfy some of the
desirable properties (summarized in Table I) and then use one of them, namely, conditional mutual information, to demonstrate
how to selectively reduce non-exempt bias in practice through case studies.
Related Works: Causal approaches for fairness have been explored in [18]–[22], including impossibility results on purely
observational measures [19], [22]. Our main novelty lies in our adoption of a rigorous axiomatic approach based on examples
and thought experiments for quantification of non-exempt bias while allowing for exemptions due to critical features. Our
quantification of non-exempt bias attempts to capture the intuitive notion of virtual constituents or proxies of Z forming inside
the black box model that cannot be attributed to the critical features Xc alone (inspired from proxy-use [22]). The decomposition
of total bias into exempt and non-exempt components is tricky. For instance, following the ideas of path-specific counterfactual
fairness [21], one might be tempted to examine specific causal paths from Z to Yˆ that pass (or do not pass) through Xc, and
deem those influences as the two measures. However, examples from the PID literature show that bias can also arise from
synergistic information about Z in both Xc and Xg, that cannot be attributed to any one of them alone, i.e., I(Z;Xc) and
I(Z;Xg) may both be 0 but I(Z;Xc, Xg) may not be (see Counterexample 3). Purely causal measures (that do not rely on the
PID framework) can attribute such bias entirely to Xc. We contend that such synergistic information, if influencing the decision,
must be included in the non-exempt component of bias because both Xc and Xg are contributors. We note that identifying such
synergy is important: synergy arises frequently in machine-learning and other related applications [50]–[54].
We are also aware that the idea of using mutual information or dependence conditioned on the critical feature(s) as a
measure of non-exempt bias has surfaced in another work [55], where the focus is on conditional debiasing of neural networks
using novel estimators. Other observational measures of non-exempt bias that examine the dependence between Z and Yˆ after
4Observational measures are those that can be estimated from the probability distribution of the data without knowledge of the underlying SCM.
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conditioning on subsets of features or other sub-groups have been used in [34], [44], [56], [57]. In this work, our focus is
on theoretical understanding of such observational measures (existing measures as well as observational relaxations of our
counterfactual measure) and relating them information-theoretically with counterfactual fairness5 [18], [20], which has not
received detailed attention. Indeed, we provide example decisions (e.g., see Counterexample 1) which may be deemed unfair by
observational measures based on conditioning, e.g., conditional mutual information (or conditional statistical parity), but are
deemed fair by counterfactual fairness [18], [20]. In light of our examples, we examine some related observational measures,
namely, justifiable fairness [56], and conditional statistical parity [55], [57] as well as the related causal measure of path-specific
counterfactual fairness [21] in Section III-C to understand what they capture and what they miss. We also discuss the utility
and the limitations of different observational relaxations of our proposed counterfactual measure in Section VI (e.g., see an
impossibility result on observational measures in Theorem 3) followed by some case studies in Section VII and a concluding
discussion in Section VIII.
B. Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background, system model and assumptions underlying
our problem formulation, i.e., how to quantify the non-exempt bias. Section III-A first states all the desirable properties that
a measure of non-exempt bias should satisfy, and then introduces our proposed counterfactual measure that satisfies all of
them (Theorem 1 in Section III-A). This is followed by a rationale behind the desirable properties through examples and
thought experiments in Section III-B. Our examples also demonstrate the utility and limitations of some existing measures,
namely, conditional statistical parity [57], path-specific counterfactual fairness [21], and justifiable fairness [56], as we discuss
in Section III-C. Next, Section IV provides insights on the overall decomposition of the total bias (in a counterfactual sense)
into exempt and non-exempt components, with each of them being further decomposed into statistically visible and masked
components (Theorem 2 in Section IV). Section V provides an impossibility result on observational measures, stating that no
observational measure can satisfy all of the desirable properties. Nonetheless, since counterfactual measures are often difficult
to realize in practice, we propose several observational relaxations of our proposed counterfactual measure in Section VI (that
only satisfy some of the desirable properties), and discuss their utility and limitations. Next, in Section VII, we use one of our
observational measure to conduct case studies on both artificial and real datasets to demonstrate practical application in training.
Finally, we conclude with a discussion in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we first provide a brief background on Partial Information Decomposition (PID) in Section II-A to help follow the
paper. Appendix B provides more details on the specific properties used in the proofs. Next, we introduce our system model and
assumptions in Section II-B. We use the following notations: (i) X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) denotes a tuple [58], i.e., an ordered
set of elements X1, X2, . . . , Xn; (ii) φ denotes the empty tuple (no elements); (iii) For tuple with a single element, the bracket
is omitted for brevity, i.e., (X1) = X1; (iv) (X,A) is equivalent to the new tuple (X1, X2, . . . , Xn, A) formed by appending
the element A at the end of tuple X; (v) X1 ∈ X means X1 is an element of tuple X; (vi) S ⊆ X means the set of elements
in tuple S form a subset of the set of elements in tuple X; and (vii) X\X2 denotes a new tuple formed by removing element
X2 from X without changing the order of other elements, i.e., (X1, X3, X4, . . . , Xn).
A. Background on Partial Information Decomposition (PID)
The PID framework [59]–[61] decomposes the mutual information I(Z; (A,B)) about a random variable Z contained in the
tuple (A,B) into four non-negative terms as follows (also see Fig. 1):
I(Z; (A,B)) = Uni(Z : A|B) + Uni(Z : B|A) + Red(Z : (A,B)) + Syn(Z : (A,B)). (1)
Here, Uni(Z : A|B) denotes the unique information about Z that is present only in A and not in B. Likewise, Uni(Z : B|A)
is the unique information about Z that is present only in B and not in A. The term Red(Z : (A,B)) denotes the redundant
information about Z that is present in both A and B, and Syn(Z : (A,B)) denotes the synergistic information not present
in either of A or B individually, but present jointly in (A,B). All four of these terms are non-negative. Also notice that,
Red(Z : (A,B)) and Syn(Z : (A,B)) are symmetric in A and B. Before defining these PID terms formally, let us understand
an intuitive example.
Example 1 (Partial Information Decomposition). Let Z = (Z1, Z2, Z3) with Z1, Z2, Z3 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2). Let A = (Z1, Z2, Z3⊕
N), B = (Z2, N), N ∼ Bern(1/2) is independent of Z. Here, I(Z; (A,B)) = 3 bits.
The unique information about Z that is contained only in A and not in B is effectively contained in Z1 and is given
by Uni(Z : A|B) = I(Z;Z1) = 1 bit. The redundant information about Z that is contained in both A and B is effectively
contained in Z2 and is given by Red(Z : (A,B)) = I(Z;Z2) = 1 bit. Lastly, the synergistic information about Z that is not
5Our measure of total bias (exempt and non-exempt) is zero if and only if the counterfactual causal influence of Z on Yˆ is zero (see Lemma 1).
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𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴, 𝐵) 𝐼(𝑍; 𝐵)
𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴) 𝑆𝑦𝑛(𝑍: (𝐴, 𝐵))
𝑈𝑛𝑖(𝑍: 𝐴|𝐵)
𝑈𝑛𝑖(𝑍: 𝐵|𝐴)
𝑅𝑒𝑑(𝑍: (𝐴, 𝐵))
(a) Venn diagram showing PID of I(Z; (A,B))
𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴, 𝐵)
𝐼(𝑍; 𝐵)𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴)
𝑆𝑦𝑛(𝑍: (𝐴, 𝐵))
𝑈𝑛𝑖(𝑍: 𝐴|𝐵)
𝑈𝑛𝑖(𝑍: 𝐵|𝐴)
𝑅𝑒𝑑(𝑍: (𝐴, 𝐵))𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴|𝐵)
𝐼(𝑍; 𝐵|𝐴)
𝐼(𝑍; 𝐴, 𝐵)
(b) Tabular Representation of PID of I(Z; (A,B))
Fig. 1: Mutual information I(Z; (A,B)) is decomposed into 4 non-negative terms, namely, Uni(Z : A|B), Uni(Z : B|A),
Red(Z : (A,B)) and Syn(Z : (A,B)). Also note that, I(Z; (A,B)) = I(Z;B) + I(Z;A | B), each of which is in turn a sum
of two PID terms. Red(Z : (A,B)) is the sub-volume between I(Z;A) and I(Z;B), and Uni(Z : A|B) is the sub-volume
between I(Z;A | B) and I(Z;A).
contained in either A or B alone, but is contained in both of them together is effectively contained in the tuple (Z3 ⊕N,N),
and is given by Syn(Z : (A,B)) = I(Z; (Z3 ⊕N,N)) = 1 bit. This accounts for the 3 bits in I(Z; (A,B)). Here, B does not
have any unique information about Z that is not contained in A, i.e., Uni(Z : B|A) = 0.
Irrespective of the formal definition of these individual terms, the following identities also hold (see Fig. 1b):
I(Z;A) = Uni(Z : A|B) + Red(Z : (A,B)). (2)
I(Z;A | B) = Uni(Z : A|B) + Syn(Z : (A,B)). (3)
Remark 1 (An Interpretation of PID as Information-Theoretic Sub-volumes). Equations (1), (2) and (3) have been represented
in a tabular fashion in Fig. 1b. Notice that, Uni(Z : A|B) can be viewed as the information-theoretic sub-volume of the
intersection between I(Z;A) and I(Z;A | B). Similarly, Red(Z : (A,B)) is the sub-volume between I(Z;A) and I(Z;B).
These equations also demonstrate that Uni(Z : A|B) and Red(Z : (A,B)) are the information contents that exhibit themselves
in I(Z;A) which is the statistically visible information content about Z present in A. Because both these PID terms are
non-negative, if any one of them is non-zero, we will have I(Z;A) > 0. Similarly, Uni(Z : B|A) and Red(Z : (A,B)) also
exhibit themselves in I(Z;B). On the other hand, Syn(Z : (A,B)) is the information content that does not exhibit itself in
I(Z;A) or I(Z;B) individually, i.e., these terms can still be 0 even if Syn(Z : (A,B)) > 0. But, Syn(Z : (A,B)) exhibits
itself in I(Z; (A,B)). Notice that,
I(Z; (A,B)) = Uni(Z : A|B) + Red(Z : (A,B))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(Z;A)
+ Uni(Z : B|A) + Syn(Z : (A,B))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(Z;B|A)
= Uni(Z : B|A) + Red(Z : (A,B))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(Z;B)
+ Uni(Z : A|B) + Syn(Z : (A,B))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(Z;A|B)
.
Given three independent equations (1), (2) and (3) in four unknowns (the four PID terms), defining any one of the terms
(e.g., Uni(Z : A|B)) is sufficient to obtain the other three. For completeness, we include the definition of unique information
from [59] (that also allows for estimation via convex optimization [62]) with the specific properties used in the proofs in
Appendix B. To follow the paper, only an intuitive understanding is sufficient.
Definition 1 (Unique Information [59]). Let ∆ be the set of all joint distributions on (Z,A,B) and ∆p be the set of joint
distributions with the same marginals on (Z,A) and (Z,B) as their true distribution, i.e.,
∆p = {Q ∈ ∆ : q(z, a)= Pr(Z=z,A=a) and q(z, b)= Pr(Z=z,B=b)}.
Then,
Uni(Z : A|B) = min
Q∈∆p
IQ(Z;A | B),
where IQ(Z;A | B) is the conditional mutual information when (Z,A,B) have joint distribution Q.
The key intuition behind this definition is that the unique information should only depend on the marginal distribution of the
pairs (Z,A) and (Z,B). This is motivated from an operational perspective that if A has unique information about Z (with
respect to B), then there must be a situation where one can predict Z better using A than B (more details in [59, Section
FAIRNESS UNDER FEATURE EXEMPTIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL AND OBSERVATIONAL MEASURES 6
2]). Therefore, all the joint distributions in the set ∆p with the same marginals essentially have the same unique information,
and the distribution Q∗ that minimizes IQ(Z;A | B) is the joint distribution that has no synergistic information leading to
IQ∗(Z;A | B) = Uni(Z : A|B). Definition 1 also defines Red(Z : (A,B)) and Syn(Z : (A,B)) using (2) and (3).
B. System Model and Assumptions
Here, we will introduce our system model and assumptions. We start with an introduction to Structural Causal Model (SCM).
Definition 2 (Structural Causal Model: SCM(U, V,F) [50]). A structural causal model (U, V,F) consists of a set of latent
(unobserved) and mutually independent variables U which are not caused by any variable in the set of observable variables
V , and a collection of deterministic functions (structural assignments) F = (F1, F2, . . .), one for each Vi ∈ V , such that:
Vi = Fi(Vpai , Ui). Here Vpai ⊆ V \Vi are the parents of Vi, and Ui ⊆ U . The structural assignment graph (SAG) of
SCM(U, V,F) has one vertex for each Vi, and directed edges to Vi from each parent in Vpai , and is always a directed acyclic
graph.
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Latent 
Variables
Observable 
Variables
Fig. 2: An SCM with protected attribute Z, features X = (X1, X2, X3), and output Yˆ . Here X and Yˆ are the observables, and
UZ and UX = (UX1 , UX2 , UX3) are the latent social factors. Z does not have any parents in the SCM and Yˆ is completely
determined by X = (X1, X2, X3).
Our System Model: For our problem, consistent with several other works on fairness [18], [19], [21], the latent variables U
represent possibly unknown social factors. The observables V consist of the protected attributes Z, the features X and the
output Yˆ (see Fig. 2). For simplicity, we assume ancestral closure of the protected attributes, i.e., the parents of any Vi ∈ Z also
lie in Z and hence Z is not caused by any of the features in X (Vi ∈ Z are source nodes in the SAG). Therefore, Z = fz(UZ)
for UZ ⊆ U . Any feature Xj in X is a function of its corresponding latent variable (UXj ) and its parents, which are again
functions of their own latent variables and parents. Therefore, each Xj can also be written as fj(Z,UX) for some deterministic
fj(·), where UX = U\UZ denotes the latent factors in U that do not cause Z (see a formal proof in [50, Proposition 6.3]).
Here, fj(·) may be constant in some of its arguments. This claim holds because the underlying graph is acyclic, and hence the
structural assignments of the ancestors of Xj can be substituted recursively into one another until all observables except Z are
substituted by latent variables. Also note that, Z ⊥ UX . A model takes X (which consists of critical features Xc and general
features Xg) as its input and produces an output Yˆ which is a deterministic function of X , i.e., Yˆ = r(X) where X is itself a
deterministic function of (Z,UX). Therefore, Yˆ = h(Z,UX) for some deterministic function h(·).
Next, we introduce the concept of Counterfactual Causal Influence (CCI) ( [18], [20], [63]–[67]), which will help us understand
the well-known causal definition of fairness called counterfactual fairness [18].
Definition 3 (Counterfactual Causal Influence: CCI(Z → Yˆ )). Consider the aforementioned system model. Let Yˆ = h(Z,UX)
for some deterministic function h(·) where UX are latent variables that do not cause Z in the true SCM. Then,
CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = EZ,Z′,UX [|h(Z,UX)− h(Z ′, UX)|] where Z ′, Z are i.i.d.
Counterfactual causal influence quantifies the change in Yˆ = h(Z,UX) if we only vary Z while keeping the other latent factors
(UX ) unchanged. A model is said to satisfy counterfactual fairness [18], [20] if and only if the output Yˆ has no counterfactual
causal influence of Z (we formally derive that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to counterfactual fairness [18] in Lemma 6
in Appendix A-B). What this means is that a model is counterfactually fair if and only if the output Yˆ = h(Z,UX) does
not change with Z while keeping the other latent factors (UX ) unchanged. It captures the intuitive notion that no virtual
constituent or proxy of Z influences the output (inspired from the work on proxy-use [22]). In other words, Yˆ ⊥ Z|UX (proved
in Lemma 1), i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z, UX = ux) = Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z′, UX = ux) ∀z, z′, y, ux.
This notion of fairness also leads us to propose an information-theoretic quantification of total bias (exempt and non-exempt)
that is 0 if and only if the counterfactual causal influence of Z on Yˆ is 0 (equivalence is demonstrated in Lemma 1 with the
proof in Appendix A-A).
Definition 4 (Total Bias). The total bias in a model is defined as I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)).
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Fig. 3: Examples for Counterfactual Fairness: Different models are used to make decisions on insurance premium corresponding
to the same SCM with Z denoting the protected attribute, UX1 denoting inherent tendency towards aggressive driving,
X1 = Z + UX1 denoting preference towards red cars, and X3 denoting a feature not related to driving.
Notice that, I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = I(Z; Yˆ |UX) + I(Z;UX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 since Z⊥UX
= I(Z; Yˆ |UX).
Lemma 1 (Equivalences of CCI). Consider the aforementioned system model. Let Yˆ = h(Z,UX) for some deterministic
function h(·) and Z ⊥ UX . Then, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 if and only if I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0.
Remark 2 (Advantage of our Information-Theoretic Quantification). One might wonder why such an information-theoretic
quantification of counterfactual causal influence (or, total bias) is necessary. The information-theoretic quantification of total
bias enables analytical decomposition into exempt and non-exempt components that better satisfy our intuitive understanding.
Our non-exempt bias intuitively attempts to capture whether discriminatory proxies are formed inside the black box model that
cannot be entirely attributed to the critical features Xc. The decomposition of counterfactual causal influence (Definition 3)
into exempt and non-exempt components is not straightforward. For instance, following the ideas of path-specific counterfactual
fairness [21], one might be tempted to examine specific causal paths from Z to Yˆ that pass (or do not pass) through Xc,
and deem those influences as the two measures. However, as the PID literature notes, bias can also arise from synergistic
information about Z in both Xc and Xg , that cannot be attributed to any one of them alone, i.e., I(Z;Xc) and I(Z;Xg) may
both be 0 but I(Z;Xc, Xg) may not be (see Counterexample 3). Purely causal measures can attribute such bias entirely to Xc.
We contend that such synergistic information, if influencing the decision, must be included in the non-exempt component of bias
because both Xc and Xg are contributors to the proxy. Information-theoretic equivalences of other existing notions of fairness,
e.g., statistical parity, equalized odds, etc. have also been used in the broader literature on fairness [5], [7], [10], [35], [68].
For a better understanding of counterfactual fairness, we now consider an example (inspired from [18]).
Example 2 (Counterfactual Fairness). Suppose a car insurance company makes its decisions about the insurance premium
based on a feature X1 which denotes your preference towards red 6 cars. In the SCM, this feature X1 = Z + UX1 where Z
denotes the protected attribute and UX1 denotes the inherent tendency towards aggressive driving which is independent of
Z. An output Yˆ = X1 is not counterfactually fair because it has counterfactual causal influence of the protected attribute Z
which is undesirable (Fig. 3a). The total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) is also non-zero, capturing the intuitive notion that a proxy of
Z influences the output. On the other hand, suppose the model now uses another feature X2 = Z and produces the output
Yˆ = X1 −X2 = UX1 . This model is now deemed counterfactually fair (Fig. 3b), and its total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) is zero. No
proxy of Z influences the output any longer.
Remark 3 (Accuracy vs Counterfactual Fairness). The goals of fairness and accuracy on a given dataset are not always
aligned [6], [15], [71], [72]. For instance, suppose the model in Example 2 takes decisions only based on a new feature
X3 = UX3 that is derived entirely from some latent factor that has got nothing to do with driving (see Fig. 3c). Such a model
may be highly inaccurate but it is still counterfactually fair because it has no counterfactual causal influence of Z and does
not cause any disparate impact with respect to Z. In this work, we will assume that a model has absolutely no bias (exempt or
non-exempt) if and only if there is no counterfactual causal influence of Z on Yˆ . We will also run into some examples that
might have lower accuracy, but it will be desirable that they are deemed fair if there is no counterfactual causal influence of Z.
Next, we propose two definitions, namely, statistically visible bias and masked bias. Statistically visible bias is an information-
theoretic quantification inspired from a well-known observational definition of fairness called statistical parity [2], [3].
6This example is inspired from [18]; also see [69], [70] to learn more about the debate on whether red cars are more prone to accidents, tickets, etc.
FAIRNESS UNDER FEATURE EXEMPTIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL AND OBSERVATIONAL MEASURES 8
Statistically
Visible BiasI 𝑍; 𝑌%Total BiasI 𝑍; (𝑌%, 𝑈!)
Masked
Bias
Statistically
Visible BiasI 𝑍; 𝑌%Total BiasI 𝑍; (𝑌%, 𝑈!)
Non-Exempt 
Bias 	𝑀"#
Exempt Bias 𝑀# How to define?
Fig. 4: Decomposition of Total Bias: (Left) Total bias (information-theoretic quantification of counterfactual causal influence) is
shown in blue. The statistically visible bias and masked bias are two sub-components of the total bias. (Right) Our goal is to
decompose the total bias into exempt and non-exempt components.
Definition 5 (Statistically Visible Bias). The statistically visible bias in a model is defined as I(Z; Yˆ ).
Statistical parity deems a model fair if and only if Z ⊥ Yˆ , i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z) = Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z′) ∀y, z, z′.
Thus, a model is said to be fair by statistical parity if and only if its statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0.
Remark 4 (Statistical Parity vs Counterfactual Fairness). Statistical parity (or independence) does not imply absence of causal
effects. E.g., consider Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX where Z,UX ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2). Here, Yˆ ⊥ Z, but Z still has a causal effect on Yˆ . If we
vary Z keeping all other sources of randomness in Yˆ constant (i.e., fixing UX = ux), then Yˆ also varies. This is, in fact, an
example of masked bias, where I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0, but Z has counterfactual causal influence on Yˆ .
Definition 6 (Masked Bias). The masked bias in a model is defined as I(Z; (Yˆ , UX))− I(Z; Yˆ ).
The masked bias is the difference between the total bias and the statistically visible bias. Notice that, I(Z; Yˆ , UX)−I(Z; Yˆ ) =
I(Z;UX | Yˆ ), implying that masked bias is non-negative. We will revisit masked bias in Section IV.
Goal: In this work, I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) will serve as our information-theoretic quantification of the total bias (exempt and non-exempt)
as we discussed in Definition 4 (also recall Lemma 1 and Remark 2). Our goal is to appropriately decompose the total bias
I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) into an exempt component (ME) and a non-exempt component (MNE), which can and cannot be explained by
the critical features Xc (also see Fig. 4). Intuitively, the total bias captures the idea of a virtual constituent or proxy of Z that
has a causal influence on the output Yˆ . We would like the exempt and non-exempt components of total bias to be able to
capture and mathematically quantify our intuitive notion of what part of the virtual constituent or proxy can and cannot be
attributed to the critical features Xc alone.
Before proceeding further, we also clarify our terminology here. We say that there is no bias when I(Z; Yˆ , UX) = 0.
Alternately, we call the bias to be exempt if only the non-exempt component is 0, though I(Z; Yˆ , UX) may be zero or non-zero.
Table II summarizes all the important notations to help follow the rest of the paper.
TABLE II: Summary of Notations
Symbol Description Observable or Not
Xc Tuple of Critical features Observable
Xg Tuple of Non-critical or general features Observable
X Tuple of all input features (critical and general) Observable
Z Protected attribute (s) Observable
UX (Note that, Z ⊥ UX ) Tuple of latent social factors that do not cause Z Not observable in general
Yˆ = r(X) = h(Z,UX) Model output Observable
III. MAIN RESULT: DESIRABLE PROPERTIES LEADING TO OUR PROPOSED MEASURE OF NON-EXEMPT BIAS
In Section III-A, we first formally state the desirable properties that a measure of non-exempt bias (MNE) should satisfy.
These properties were only intuitively stated in Section I. Next, we introduce our proposed measure that satisfies all these
properties (Theorem 1 in Section III-A). In Section III-B, we discuss in detail on how we arrive at these desirable properties
through several examples, counterexamples and thought experiments, that helps us quantify our intuitive notion of non-exempt
bias. In Section III-C, we examine measures in existing literature that have some provision for exemptions, namely, conditional
statistical parity [57], path-specific counterfactual fairness [21] and justifiable fairness [56].
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A. Main Result: Desirable Properties and a Proposed Measure Satisfying All of Them
We first state our set of desirable properties for any measure of non-exempt bias (MNE). Firstly, if all the features are in the
set Xg and there is no critical feature (i.e., Xc = φ), then we would like MNE to be equal to the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)), i.e.,
the entire bias is non-exempt.
Property 1 (Absence of Exemptions). If the set of critical features, Xc = φ, then a measure MNE should be equal to the
total bias, i.e., I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)).
Next, for a fixed set of features and a fixed model Yˆ = h(Z,UX), it may also be desirable that the measure MNE either
decrease or stay the same if more features are removed from the set Xg and added to Xc.
Property 2 (Non-Increasing with More Exemptions). For a fixed set of features X and a fixed model Yˆ = h(Z,UX), a measure
MNE should be non-increasing if a feature is removed from Xg and added to Xc.
We require the measure MNE to be 0 if all the features are in the exempt set Xc.
Property 3 (Complete Exemption). MNE should be 0 if all features are exempt, i.e., Xc = X and Xg = φ.
Next, the measure should also avoid false positive conclusions, e.g., it should be 0 if the final model output has no
counterfactual causal influence of Z, leading to the following property.
Property 4 (Zero Influence). MNE should be 0 if CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 (or equivalently, I(Z; Yˆ , UX) = 0).
It is desirable that the measure be non-zero if Yˆ has any unique information about Z that is not present in Xc because then
that information is also attributed to Xg (more examples are provided in Section III-B to further motivate this property; see
Counterexample 1, Counterexample 3, etc.).
Property 5 (Non-Exempt Statistically Visible Bias). MNE should be strictly greater than 0 if Yˆ has any unique information
about Z. Thus, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 should imply that MNE > 0.
However, statistical masking can sometimes prevent the entire non-exempt bias from exhibiting itself in Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) as
demonstrated in the following example (recall Remark 4 in Section II). This example is inspired from [4], [18], [22].
Example 3 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias). An ad for expensive housing is presented to white people (Z = 1) with income above
a threshold (UX1 = 1), and also to black people (Z = 0) with income below a threshold (UX1 = 0) (while being largely
irrelevant to the latter) with Z and UX1 being i.i.d. Bern(1/2). Here, let X1 = UX1 and X2 = Z, where X1 may or may not
be critical but X2 is definitely not critical, i.e., X2 is a feature included in Xg. The model output is given by Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1
where ⊕ means XOR.
It is evident that this model is unfair to high-income black people. This is a scenario where a virtual constituent Z is formed
from Xg that is causally influencing the output (in a counterfactual sense; recall Definition 3 in Section II) but due to statistical
masking, I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. Since Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) ≤ I(Z; Yˆ ) (recall (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of all PID terms), we
have Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0 for this canonical example, showing that it fails to capture such “non-exempt masked bias.”
Based on this example, one may feel that instead of examining the unique information about Z in Yˆ alone, we should examine
the unique information in (Yˆ , UX). The intuition is that the masked bias (or information) about Z in Yˆ becomes exposed in
(Yˆ , UX). Indeed, our total bias is also given by I(Z; Yˆ , UX) which captures the total (statistically visible and masked) bias,
not captured by the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) alone. This leads to a candidate measure Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) to capture
the entire non-exempt bias (statistically visible and masked). However, sometimes Z may already be statistically masked in
Xc, e.g., Xc = Z + UX1 with Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2), and remain so in the final output, e.g., Yˆ = Xc (Counterexample 4
in Section III-B). In such scenarios, it is desirable that the total bias be exempted and MNE be 0 because the output is
entirely derived from the critical feature. However, Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) is greater than 0 here (Supporting Derivation 3 in
Appendix C-B). This leads to the intuition that UX can be divided into two subsets Ua and Ub (further functional generalizations
discussed in Section VIII), where Ua consists of the latent factors that do not need to be accounted for as candidate masks,
e.g., latent factors that do not influence Yˆ at all, or those that already mask Z in Xc and continue to do so in the final output,
as in the example above. On the other hand, Ub consists of the remaining latent factors, arising from both Xc and Xg, that
need to be accounted for as candidate masks, e.g., those that possibly contribute to statistical masking “inside the black box
model.” This intuition leads to another desirable property (more examples are provided in Section III-B to further motivate this
property; see Example 4, Counterexample 4, etc.).
Property 6 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias). MNE should be non-zero in Example 3, the canonical example of non-exempt masked
bias. However, MNE should be 0 if (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) form a Markov chain for some subsets Ua, Ub ⊆ UX such that
Ua = UX\Ub.
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Intuitively, Properties 5 and 6 attempt to provide lower and upper bounds on a measure of non-exempt bias, i.e., it is desirable
that Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) ≤MNE ≤ minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc). These two properties, in conjunction with the
remaining four, lead to a novel measure of non-exempt bias that satisfies all of them (proved in Theorem 1).
Definition 7 (Non-Exempt Bias). Our proposed measure of non-exempt bias is given by:
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) such that Ua = UX\Ub.
Theorem 1 (Properties). Properties 1-6 are satisfied by our proposed measure
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) such that Ua = UX\Ub.
Proof Sketch: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix C-A. Here, we provide a brief proof sketch. For Property 1, we show
that when Xc = φ, we have M∗NE = minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub) = I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)). Property 2 is derived using a
monotonicity property of unique information [73, Lemma 32]. For Property 3,
M∗NE ≤ Uni(Z,UX : Yˆ |X)
(a)
≤ I(Z,UX ; Yˆ |X) (b)= 0, (4)
where (a) holds because unique information is a component of conditional mutual information (see (3) in Section II-A) and (b)
holds as Yˆ is a deterministic function of X . For Property 4, note that
M∗NE ≤ Uni(Z : Yˆ , UX |Xc) ≤ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)), (5)
where the last step holds as unique information is also a component of mutual information (see (2) in Section II-A). For
Property 5, we show that M∗NE≥Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) using another monotonicity property of unique information [73, Lemma 31].
Lastly, for Property 6, we have I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub|Xc) = 0 for some Ua, Ub, implying that Uni(Z,Ua : Yˆ , Ub|Xc) is also 0 for
those Ua, Ub because unique information is a component of conditional mutual information (see (3) in Section II-A).
Remark 5 (On Exhaustive Set of Properties leading to a Unique Measure). We note that our properties do not quantify how
exactly the non-exempt bias should “scale” when the measure is nonzero since they are only conditions on when this bias is
nonzero, or on the monotonicity of this bias. Hence, these properties do not lead to a unique measure. Also, note that this is an
issue with all measures of fairness in that they go to zero based on an intuitive notion of fairness but their exact scaling when
they are non-zero is not unique. Neither do we claim that the proposed list of desirable properties (axioms) are exhaustive.
In general, it is difficult to prove that a proposed set of properties (or, axioms) is exhaustive for a problem. E.g., Shannon
established uniqueness on entropy with respect to some properties in [74] but the needs of the application can still drive the
use of alternate measures. E.g. Renyi measures [25], [68], [75]–[77] have been found to be useful in security and privacy
applications because they weigh outliers differently. Therefore, we believe, that there may be value in the measure not being
unique so that it can be tuned to the needs of the application, as well as, motivate future work in this direction. Nonetheless,
our properties do capture important aspects of the problem, e.g., non-exempt masked and non-exempt statistically visible biases,
as discussed in Section IV.
Next, we provide the rationale behind all our desirable properties using thought experiments.
B. Rationale Behind the Desirable Properties
It is desirable that our measure of non-exempt bias is able to capture and mathematically quantify our intuitive notion of
a virtual constituent or proxy of Z being formed inside a given black box model that causally influences the output Yˆ and
that cannot be attributed to the critical features Xc alone. In order to propose such a quantification, we will examine several
examples (thought experiments) that help us arrive at a set of desirable properties (axioms) that any measure of non-exempt
bias should satisfy in order to be consistent with our intuitive notions. In these examples, we will explicitly note when a virtual
constituent or proxy of Z is formed inside the model that influences the output, and whether it is entirely explainable by Xc.
Remark 6 (On Simplicity of Examples). We note that, at a first glance, our examples might seem quite simple, and real
world models will only be more complex due to a mix of various causal and statistical relationships. These simple examples
help us isolate many of these individual causal and statistical relationships, and examine them carefully. For instance, when
both non-exempt masked and non-exempt statistically visible biases are present together, we are able to quantify both of them
appropriately (discussed further in Section IV). Thus, developing an axiomatic understanding of such simple examples is an
essential first step in understanding the complex interplay of various relationships in a real dataset. Indeed, examining toy
examples (also called thought experiments) is a common practice in several works in existing fairness literature [18], [19], [36],
[37], [56], some of which have also inspired our examples in this work. Furthermore, our quantification of non-exempt bias is
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Fig. 5: Thought experiments to understand total bias, exempt bias and non-exempt bias: In all the figures, Z denotes the
protected attribute, e.g., gender, race, etc., and UX1 denotes other latent social factors such that Z ⊥ UX1 .
not limited to black-box models alone, but also applies to “white-box” models [22], e.g., decision trees, linear classifiers, etc.,
and also to non-AI-based decisions as long as the decision can be represented as a deterministic function of the input features,
i.e., Yˆ = h(X).
Now, we move on to the rationale behind our desirable properties. The first three properties are more or less intuitive. For
Property 1, if no feature is critical, it essentially means that all features are non-critical/general and no bias is exempt. So, we
would like our measure of non-exempt bias to quantify the total bias given by I(Z; Yˆ , UX). For Property 2, we argue that
under a fixed model Yˆ = h(Z,UX), as the set of features designated as “critical” increases, a larger portion of the total bias
is deemed exempt. Therefore the non-exempt bias is non-increasing (i.e., it decreases or stays the same). Ultimately, if all
the features in a model are designated as critical, i.e., Xc = X , then the total bias becomes exempt, leading to MNE being 0
(Property 3).
To arrive at the remaining desirable properties, we start out with examining two canonical examples that help us motivate the
basic intuition behind non-exempt bias. These examples also help us understand the limitations of statistical parity [2], [3] and
equalized odds [4] which are two popular measures of fairness that do not have provision for critical feature exemptions.
A Case against Statistical Parity:
As discussed in Section II, a model is deemed fair by statistical parity if Z ⊥ Yˆ , i.e., I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. However, the following
example exposes some of its limitations.
Example 4 (Hiring Software Engineers with Coding Skills). Let Xc = Z +UX1 be the score in a coding test7 and Xg = UX2
be a prior work experience score. Here the protected attribute Z ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes gender, UX1 ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes inner
ability to code and UX2 ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes experience. An algorithm is deciding whether to hire software engineers based on
a score Yˆ = Z + UX1 + UX2 . This is shown in Fig. 5a. Here + denotes addition (not to be confused with the binary OR).
First notice that this model will be deemed unfair by both statistical parity and counterfactual fairness. Statistical parity
is violated because Z and Yˆ are not independent, i.e., the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0. Consequently, the total bias
I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) is also non-zero since I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) ≥ I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0, violating counterfactual fairness. However, for this example,
the score in the coding test is a critical feature (bonafide requirement) for the job. Therefore, one may feel that any bias in Yˆ
that is explainable by the score in a coding test should be exempted. An attempt to ensure statistical parity for such an example,
e.g., by reducing the importance (weight) of the critical feature in the decision making, violates the bonafide requirement of the
job. Intuitively, even though the virtual constituent or proxy of Z, namely, Z + UX1 , influences the output Yˆ , it is entirely
explainable by Xc. Thus, for such an example, it is desirable that a measure of discrimination (non-exempt bias MNE) be 0.
A Case against Equalized Odds:
Equalized odds [4], [10] is another popular measure of fairness that attempts to address this limitation of statistical parity by
using the true labels (or scores) to represent the requirements of the job. Equalized odds states that a model is fair if
Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z, Y = y˜) = Pr(Yˆ = y|Z = z′, Y = y˜) ∀z, z′, y, y˜.
This criterion is also equivalent to Yˆ ⊥ Z|Y , or, I(Z; Yˆ | Y ) = 0. Indeed, in the previous example (Example 4), if the true
scores already incorporate this critical requirement in them, e.g., Y = Z +UX1 +UX2 , then I(Z; Yˆ | Y ) = 0, and the model is
deemed fair by equalized odds. While equalized odds is a reasonable quantification in scenarios where the true label (or score)
7The influence of Z on score in the SCM can arise due to various factors, e.g., historical lack of opportunities or sampling bias due to candidates of one
protected group not applying enough etc. For instance, there may be a hidden node representing opportunity such that Z influences the score only though that
hidden node, and the score becomes independent of Z given opportunity. We adopt a simplistic representation here for ease of understanding (also see [78]).
FAIRNESS UNDER FEATURE EXEMPTIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL AND OBSERVATIONAL MEASURES 12
is indeed a justified representation of the job requirements, the measure I(Z; Yˆ | Y ) has often criticized to be affected by label
bias, as we demonstrate through this example.
Example 5 (Discrimination in Admissions). Let Xc = UX1 denote the score in a standardized test and Xg =
{
UX + 1, Z = 0
UX , Z = 1
denote the score from recommendation letters (biased). This can be rewritten as Xg = Z(UX2 + 1) + (1−Z)UX2 = Z +UX2 ,
where Z ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes gender, UX1 ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes the latent ability and UX2 ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes knowledge. Now
suppose, the historic dataset has true selection scores given by Y = UX1 + Z + UX2 . This is shown in Fig. 5b.
In this scenario, suppose we choose a perfect predictor, i.e., Yˆ = Y = UX1 + Z + UX2 . The perfect predictor always
satisfies equalized odds because I(Z; Yˆ | Y ) = 0 if Yˆ = Y . However, if examined deeply, this model is propagating bias from
recommendation letters, a non-critical feature, which is discriminatory and non-exempt. Intuitively, a virtual constituent or
proxy of Z, i.e., Z +UX2 , is being formed from Xg that is influencing the output Yˆ . For such an example
8, it is desirable that
a measure of discrimination (non-exempt bias MNE) is not zero.
Next, we start out with the aim of finding a suitable measure of non-exempt bias (MNE) that takes the desirable values
for both these canonical examples. Notice that, both these examples can be resolved by a notion of conditional statistical
parity [57], which deems a model as fair if and only if Z ⊥ Yˆ |Xc, i.e.,
Pr(Yˆ = y|Xc = xc, Z = z) = Pr(Yˆ = y|Xc = xc, Z = z′) ∀y, xc, z, z′.
This idea also connects with Simpson’s paradox [50] which refers to a statistical trend that appears in several different groups of
data but disappears or reverses when these groups are combined. In Example 4, Z and Yˆ are not independent but they become
so when conditioned on Xc, i.e., I(Z; Yˆ ) > I(Z; Yˆ | Xc). In Example 5, I(Z; Yˆ ) < I(Z; Yˆ | Xc). This notion of conditional
statistical parity leads us to propose the following quantification of non-exempt bias (MNE).
Candidate Measure 1. MNE = I(Z; Yˆ | Xc).
This measure resolves both Example 4 and 5. However, the following example exposes some of its limitations.
Counterexample 1 (Counterfactually Fair College Admissions). Let Z ∼ Bern(1/2) be the protected attribute, and let UX ∼
N (0, σ2) be the latent ability of a student. Also, let Xg = UX be the score of a student in their high-school exam, but
the score in an admission interview (critical feature) is given by Xc =
{
UX + 1, Z = 0
UX , Z = 1
. This can be rewritten as
Xc = Z(UX + 1) + (1 − Z)UX = Z + UX . Suppose the model for deciding admissions that maximizes accuracy is
Yˆ = Xg = UX . This is shown in Fig. 5c.
Notice that, this model is deemed fair by counterfactual fairness because the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0. This means that
the output Yˆ has no counterfactual causal influence of Z. Even though the bias from Xc is legally exempt, the trained black-box
model happens to base its decisions on another available non-critical feature that has no counterfactual causal influence of Z.
Thus, there is no bias in the outcome Yˆ (this is true even if the features in Xc were not exempt). Therefore, it is desirable that
the non-exempt bias MNE is also 0. This is also consistent with the intuition that here no virtual constituent or proxy of Z
influences the output. However, the candidate measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = I(Z;UX | Z + UX) is non-zero here, leading to a false
positive conclusion in detecting non-exempt bias.
Remark 7 (Cancellation of Paths). A similar situation arises if Xc = Z + UX , Xg = Z and Yˆ = Xc − Xg = UX . Even
though the bias from Xc may be exempt, the trained model ends up removing the counterfactual causal influence of Z from the
decisions to make them counterfactually fair in a manner similar to the example of insurance premiums (recall Example 2 in
Section II; also shown in Fig. 3b). The influences of Z along two different causal paths cancel each other in the final output,
so that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 (and, I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0). Since the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0, the question of non-exempt or
exempt bias does not arise. However, the candidate measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) is non-zero here.
This example also serves as a rationale for the property of zero influence, i.e., Property 4 which states that MNE should be
0 if the total bias is 0. We aim to find a measure that resolves all of these examples (summarized in Fig. 5).
Motivation for Unique Information:
We notice that conditioning on the critical feature Xc can increase or decrease mutual information. In Example 4, we
have I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0 but I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = 0. In Counterexample 1, I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0 but I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. For both these cases, it is
desirable that MNE = 0. This motivates us to consider another candidate measure of non-exempt bias that is equal to the
information-theoretic sub-volume of intersection between I(Z; Yˆ ) and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) (recall Fig. 1b), that goes to 0 when any
8The example can be made more realistic if UX1 , UX2 are i.i.d. N (0, 1). Now suppose, the historic dataset has true labels given by Y =
sgn
(
Z + UX1 + UX2 − 0.5
)
which is binary. A perfect classifier Yˆ = Y , that satisfies equalized odds, is still discriminatory because it is influenced by Z
in its decision, that is arising from recommendation letters, a non-critical feature.
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one of them is 0. This is a quantity that is derived from the PID literature, and is called the unique information of Z in Yˆ that
is not present in Xc.
Candidate Measure 2. MNE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc).
We now show that this measure resolves the examples discussed so far, namely, Example 4 (Fig. 5a), Example 5 (Fig. 5b),
Counterexample 1 (Fig. 5c) and a (similar) example in Remark 7. We start with Example 4 (the canonical example of hiring
software engineers with coding skills), where Yˆ = Z+UX1 +UX2 and Xc = Z+UX1 . Recall that the total mutual information
(statistically visible bias) can be decomposed as follows:
I(Z; Yˆ ) = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) + Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) (from (2) in Section II-A).
For this example, we notice that even though I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0, we have Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0. This is because,
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) + Syn(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) (from (3) in Section II-A),
and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = 0 for Example 4. In Example 4, the entire statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) is essentially redundant
information between Yˆ and Xc which is exempted.
Next, we revisit Example 5 (Yˆ = UX1 + Z + UX2 and Xc = UX1) where it is intuitive that the measure of non-exempt
bias should be non-zero. Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is non-zero here (see Supporting Derivation 1 in Appendix C-B), consistent with our
intuition. As a proof sketch, recall the tabular representation in Fig. 1b. Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) is the sub-volume of intersection
between I(Z;Xc) and I(Z; Yˆ ), and hence goes to zero because I(Z;Xc) = 0. This leads to Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = I(Z; Yˆ ) which
is non-zero here.
Lastly, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is also 0 in Counterexample 1 (counterfactually fair college admissions) and the (similar) example of
cancellation of paths in Remark 7. More importantly, we note that, while conditional mutual information I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) may be
non-zero even if the the total bias or counterfactual causal influence is 0 (as in Counterexample 1), unique information is not. In
Lemma 13 in Appendix B, we show that Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is always zero if the total bias or counterfactual causal influence is 0,
i.e., I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0. In fact, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is a sub-volume or component of the previous candidate measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc),
that is guaranteed to be 0 if the total bias is zero.
These examples serve as our rationale for the property of non-exempt statistically visible bias, i.e., Property 5 which states
that MNE should be 0 if Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0. In fact, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is the information-theoretic sub-volume (intersection)
between I(Z; Yˆ ) and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc), that captures the non-exempt part of the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ).
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc), however, is not sufficient as a candidate measure as it fails to capture non-exempt masked bias, as we will
demonstrate in Counterexample 2. Thus, Property 5 is a one-way implication only, i.e., sometimes MNE may still need to
be non-zero even when Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0. Property 5 only captures the non-exempt statistically visible bias that cannot be
accounted for by Xc alone.
Counterexample 2 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias in Housing Ads; A Special Case of Example 3 in Section III-A). Let Xc = UX1
and Xg = Z where the protected attribute Z ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes race and UX1 ∼ Bern(1/2) denotes whether the income is
above a threshold. The model decides to show an expensive housing ad based on Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 (same as Example 3 in
Section III-A with Xc = X1). This is shown in Fig. 5d.
This model will be deemed fair by statistical parity because Z ⊥ Yˆ , i.e., the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. However,
the model racially discriminates against half of the population (high-income people with Z = 0) for whom the housing ad is
relevant. This is also supported by the fact that that the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) > 0. Intuitively, here a virtual constituent or
proxy (Z) is formed inside the black box model that influences the output and that is derived entirely from Xg. For such an
example, it is desirable that the non-exempt bias MNE should not be 0. In fact, this example demonstrates that there may
be non-exempt bias even when the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0 but I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0. Here, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) fails to
capture the masked bias because it has to be zero whenever I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0 (using (2) in Section II-A).
One commonality that we notice in the examples so far (see Fig. 5) is that whenever it is desirable that MNE be zero, either
there is no counterfactual causal influence of Z on Yˆ (i.e., CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0) or the influence of Z on Yˆ has propagated
only along paths that pass through Xc. In scenarios where CCI(Z → Yˆ ) 6= 0, we will define another candidate measure of
non-exempt bias that is inspired from the notion of path-specific counterfactual fairness [21] (also see [18], [19]). The next
candidate measure for quantifying non-exempt bias is a causal, path-specific quantification by varying Z only along the direct
paths through Xg and comparing if it causes any change in the model output (also see Fig. 6a).
Candidate Measure 3. Let Yˆ = h(Z,UX) in the true causal model. Assume a new causal graph with a new source node Z ′
having an independent and identical distribution as Z where we replace all direct edges from Z to Xg with an edge from Z ′ to
Xg . Let Yˆ = h˜(Z,Z ′, UX) in the new causal graph. A candidate measure is MNE = EZ,Z′,UX
[
|h(Z,UX)− h˜(Z,Z ′, UX)|
]
.
This measure, when used in conjunction with CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0, resolves the examples so far (see Fig. 5). For Example 4,
it is zero and for Example 5, it is non-zero, as desired. For Counterexample 1, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0, and hence there is no need
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(a) Path-specific quantification of non-exempt bias: (Left) Original model with output h(Z,UX).
(Right) Z is varied to Z′ along direct paths through Xg resulting in output h˜(Z,Z′, UX). Candidate
measure 3 quantifies the expected value of the change in output due to path-specific variation in Z.
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(b) Discrimination by unmasking
(Counterexample 3)
Fig. 6: Path-specific quantification of non-exempt bias (Candidate measure 3) and its counterexample
for a path-specific examination. Lastly, for the example of non-exempt masked bias (Counterexample 2), this measure is 0 in
spite of the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) being 0. However, the following example exposes some of its limitations.
Counterexample 3 (Discrimination by Unmasking). Suppose that Xc = Z ⊕ UX1 and Xg = UX1 where Z and UX1 are i.i.d.
Bern(1/2). Let Yˆ = Xc ⊕Xg = Z. This is shown in Fig. 6b.
The bias in this example will be deemed exempt by a causal path-specific examination. However, this model has statistically
visible bias (I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0) that cannot be attributed to Xc alone. Following the PID literature, here Xc and Xg have synergistic
information about Z that ultimately appears in Yˆ which in itself is the virtual constituent or proxy of Z being formed in this
model. This synergistic information cannot be attributed to Xc alone because I(Z;Xc) = 0. This is further supported by the
argument that Xg and Xc together lead to a better estimate of Z than Xc alone which means Xg is definitely a contributor to
the bias. Thus, MNE should be greater than 0. This is further supported by the fact that here Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 (Supporting
Derivation 2 in Appendix C-B) because it is this “joint” information about Z in (Xc, Xg) that ultimately appears in Yˆ that
cannot be attributed to Xc alone.
Next, our question of interest is: how to arrive at a property and a measure that correctly captures the intuition of non-exempt
masked bias? Let us revisit the candidate measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc). This measure resolves all the examples so far (see Fig. 5
and Fig. 6b) except giving a false positive conclusion in Counterexample 1. Notice that, I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) is zero if and only if
Z −Xc − Yˆ form a Markov chain. While the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ may not always hold even when it is desirable for
MNE to be zero as in Counterexample 1, we have seen that in all the examples so far where the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ
holds, it has been desirable that MNE be zero (possible one-way implication). Assuming that the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ
is a sufficient condition for MNE to be zero, we proposed the following property of non-exempt masked bias in our prior
work [1].
MNE should be non-zero in the example of non-exempt masked bias, i.e., Counterexample 2 (special case of Example 3 with
Xc = UX1 , Xg = Z, and Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 ) even if I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. But, MNE should be 0 if the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ holds.
Remark 8 (Relation to our prior work [1]). In our prior work [1], this property, in conjunction with Properties 3, 4, and 5, leads
to a measure that quantifies only a sub-volume of I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) that no longer gives false positive conclusion in Counterexample 1
while still resolving all the other examples. The measure proposed in [1] is essentially the information-theoretic sub-volume of
the intersection between I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) and total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)), which goes to 0 whenever either of them is 0 (details are
provided in Appendix C-C)9.
The property of non-exempt masked bias stated in [1] is built on the rationale that in the example of non-exempt masked
bias in housing ads (Example 3 where Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 ), instead of UX1 being the income, if UX1 is a random coin flip used to
randomize the race, then this scenario may not necessarily be regarded as non-exempt. Then, we would have Xc = φ and
Xg = (Z,UX1), and the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ would hold, deeming this example as exempt. In [1], the goal was to only
account for non-exempt masked bias in MNE when the “mask” is either a critical feature or arises exclusively from the critical
features, e.g., Counterexample 2 (a special case of Example 3 with Xc = UX1 , Xg = Z and Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1) while any mask
from the non-critical or general features were viewed more like these random coin flips. But what if the user wishes to also
account for masked bias if the mask is arising from Xg as well, as demonstrated in the following example.
Example 6 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias in Housing Ads; A Special Case of Example 3 in Section III-A). Let Xc = φ and
Xg = (Z,UX1) with Z,UX1 ∼ Bern(1/2) and Yˆ = Z ⊕UX1 (UX1 is still income like in Example 3 but is not a critical feature).
9One might also wonder why a measure of the form of a product, i.e., MNE = I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) × I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) does not work instead. We discuss a
counterexample for such a product measure in [1] that we also include in Appendix C-C here for completeness.
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Example 6 will be deemed exempt by [1] because the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ holds. Consequently, the measure proposed
in [1] will also be 0 because it is a non-negative sub-component of I(Z; Yˆ |Xc). However, here the virtual constituent or proxy
Z is arising from Xg and is being masked by another feature of Xg, i.e., UX1 . If UX1 denotes income and Yˆ denotes the
decision of showing housing ads, then the model is again unfair to high-income people of one race. This argument is also
supported by the fact that the total bias is non-zero (not counterfactually fair). Since Xc = φ, no bias is exempt, and a measure
of non-exempt bias should ideally capture the total bias in this model.
In this work, we focus on defining an alternate criterion (modification of the property of non-exempt masked bias in [1])
that can capture non-exempt masked bias irrespective of whether the “mask” arises from the critical or non-critical features.
What this means is that any scenario deemed exempt by the property of non-exempt masked bias in [1] will also be deemed
exempt by our modified property10 but it is desirable that our modified property also accounts for additional scenarios, such as
Example 6, that are deemed exempt by the former property even though intuitively, it may not be reasonable to do so.
Example 6 reveals that the Markov chain Z −Xc − Yˆ holding may not always imply that there is no non-exempt bias. In
the output Yˆ , the constituent Z may be masked by some elements of UX , e.g., Ub ⊆ UX that could arise from both Xc and
Xg. Based on the examples of masked bias, one might be tempted to examine the information about Z present in (Yˆ , UX)
instead of Yˆ alone, e.g., examine the following Markov chain: Z −Xc − (Yˆ , UX) instead of Z −Xc − Yˆ . Motivated by this
idea, we now consider another candidate measure Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc), i.e., the unique information about Z present jointly in
(Yˆ , UX) (instead of Yˆ alone), that is not present in Xc. Again note that, we consider unique information instead of conditional
mutual information because of two reasons: (i) The conditional mutual information I(Z; (Yˆ , UX) | Xc) corresponding to this
Markov chain is greater than or equal to I(Z; Yˆ | Xc), and therefore will again lead to a false conclusion about detecting
non-exempt bias in Counterexample 1 where the total bias is 0. On the other hand, we show in Lemma 13 in Appendix B that
Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) is less than or equal to the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)), and thus can never be non-zero when the total bias
is 0. (ii) Unique information, being a sub-volume of conditional mutual information, goes to zero whenever the corresponding
conditional mutual information is zero (i.e., the Markov chain holds).
Candidate Measure 4. MNE = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc).
While this measure resolves all the examples so far (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6b), the following example exposes some of its limitations.
Counterexample 4 (Complete Exemption). Suppose that Xc = Z + UX1 , Xg = UX2 , and Yˆ = Xc = Z + UX1 where
Z,UX1 , UX2 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
Here, Yˆ is entirely derived from Xc which is the critical feature. Thus, the total bias is exempt (also notice the Markov chain
Z −Xc − Yˆ ). However, Candidate Measure 4 can be shown to be non-zero here using the properties of unique information in
Definition 1 (Supporting Derivation 3 in Appendix C-B). The key step is that Z can be obtained entirely from deterministic
local operations on (Yˆ , UX) and therefore Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) ≥ Uni(Z : Z|Xc) using a monotonicity property of unique
information. Because unique information is a sub-volume of conditional mutual information, it being non-zero also implies that
the Markov chain Z −Xc − (Yˆ , UX) does not hold.
Ideally, we would like a property and a measure that captures the intuition in this example. The main intuition is that Z was
already masked by UX1 in Xc, and it remained so in the output Yˆ (unlike Counterexample 3 where the mask on Z in Xc
was tampered inside the model). In this example, we do not need to account for the masking of Z by UX1 because it did not
happen inside the black-box model, and neither did it get tampered in any manner inside the model. Notice that, the Markov
chain Z −Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) holds if Ub ⊆ UX\UX1 , i.e., if UX1 is removed from the candidate masks that one needs to account
for. This motivates the possibility that one might be able to split the set of latent factors UX (see Sec. VIII for a functional
generalization) into two parts (say Ua and Ub) such that Ua consists of all the latent factors that either do not influence Yˆ at all,
or already mask the constituent Z in Xc and remain untampered in Yˆ . The other part Ub corresponds to candidate masks that
one might want to account for, e.g., masking effects that happened inside the black-box model (recall Example 4 in Fig. 5a),
or if Z was already masked by some latent factors inside Xg (recall Example 5 in Fig. 5b). To understand this better, let us
revisit Example 4 (canonical example of hiring software engineers with coding skills) again.
Intuitively, the total bias in this example is exempt because Z was already masked by UX1 in Xc, and the mask remained
untampered in the final output with only additional independent masks added inside the black-box model. The criterion
Z −Xc − (Yˆ , UX) does not hold here. But, interestingly, the following Markov chain does hold: Z −Xc − (Yˆ , UX2). Here,
again one might choose to only account for the masking by UX2 because it is happening inside the black-box model. Thus,
here we can let Ua = UX1 , and Ub = UX2 . Interestingly, we notice that (Z,Ua)−Xc − Yˆ also form a Markov chain because
Ua consists of only the latent factors that already mask Z in Xc and remain untampered in the final output Yˆ , e.g., UX1
in Example 4. One might therefore consider a candidate measure of non-exempt bias given by Uni(Z : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) where
Ub ⊆ UX is an appropriately defined subset of the candidate masks that one wishes to account. This measure, as stated, is
10We show in Lemma 2 that the Markov chain in our modified property, i.e., (Z,Ua)−Xc− (Yˆ , Ub) also implies Z−Xc− Yˆ , but the opposite implication
is not true.
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somewhat ill-defined because the set Ub also depends on the choice of the critical features, and hence would need to be
identified for different choices of Xc for the same mathematical scenario.
To arrive at a measure that is more precisely defined, we now examine an alternate criterion, namely, a Markov chain of the
form (Z,Ua)−Xc− (Yˆ , Ub) that in fact implies both the criterion (Z,Ua)−Xc− Yˆ and Z−Xc− (Yˆ , Ub) (see Lemma 2 with
proof in Appendix C-A). This is motivated from the previous example, where neither Z−Xc− (Yˆ , UX) nor (Z,UX)−Xc− Yˆ
hold, but (Z,UX1)−Xc − (Yˆ , UX2) does. This leads us to propose the following criterion for any measure of non-exempt bias
(MNE) that also serves as our main rationale for Property 6.
MNE should be 0 if (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) form a Markov chain for some subsets Ua, Ub ⊆ UX such that Ua = UX\Ub.
Lemma 2. The Markov chain (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) implies that the following Markov chains also hold: (i) Z −Xc − Yˆ ;
(ii) (Z,Ua)−Xc − Yˆ ; and (ii) Z −Xc − (Yˆ , Ub).
The Markov chain (Z,Ua)−Xc−(Yˆ , Ub) holding implies MNE=0, but the Markov chain not holding for all Ua, Ub such that
Ua = UX\Ub does not necessarily imply that MNE 6= 0. This criterion (Z,Ua)−Xc−(Yˆ , Ub) implying MNE = 0 only attempts
to provide an upper bound on MNE , i.e., it is desirable that MNE ≤ minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) such that
Ua = UX\Ub. The measure minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) does not suffice in itself as a measure of non-exempt
bias because it again does not satisfy Property 4. To see this, notice that minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) ≥
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) (see proof of Lemma 2), and thus, it also gives a false positive conclusion about non-exempt bias in Counterexample 1
(counterfactually fair college admissions). Property 6, in conjunction with all the other properties, ultimately lead us to our
proposed measure of non-exempt bias, given by:
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) such that Ua = UX\Ub.
This proposed measure satisfies all of the six desirable properties (see proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C-A). To develop
intuition on what this measure captures, we will now discuss how this measure resolves all of the examples in this work. We
group “similar” examples together.
Scenarios where total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) is zero: This applies to Counterexample 1 and the related example in Remark 7.
Because minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) ≤ Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) ≤ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) (see proof of Theorem 1
in Appendix C-A), it satisfies Property 4 and goes to 0 whenever total bias is 0.
Scenarios where Z is already masked in Xc and remains so in the output (with or without additional independent
masks): This applies to Example 4 and Counterexample 4. We will only discuss Example 4 here since it can explain the other
one as well. We will examine the value of Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) for different choices of Ua ⊆ UX to find the minimum.
First notice that, if Ua = φ (and Ub = UX ), we have
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc)
(a)
≥ Uni(Z : Z|Xc) > 0
(see Supporting Derivation 3 in Appendix C-B; (a) holds from a monotonicity property of unique information because Z
can be obtained from deterministic local operations on (Yˆ , UX)). This is in agreement with the intuition that UX1 should
not belong to the set of candidate masks (Ub) that need to be accounted for. Next, if Ua = UX1 (and Ub = UX2), we have
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 0 (implied from the Markov chain (Z,UX1) − Xc − (Yˆ , UX2)). Since unique information is
non-negative, we therefore have minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 0. In essence, the pair (U∗a , U∗b ) that
minimizes Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) is such that U∗a = UX1 , and the candidate masks that need to be accounted for, i.e.,
U∗b = UX2 .
Now, what happens to the value of Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) if the accountable mask UX2 is instead in Ua? We have
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc)
(a)
≥ Uni(UX2 : Yˆ |Xc)
(b)
= I(UX2 ; Yˆ ),
which is strictly greater than 0. This agrees with the intuition that UX2 should belong to the candidate set of masks that one
should account for (Ub). Here (a) holds using two monotonicity properties of unique information (see Properties 10 and 9 in
Appendix B) and (b) holds because I(UX2 ;Xc) = 0, leading to Red(UX2 : (Yˆ , Xc)) = 0.
Scenarios where non-exempt statistically visible bias is present, i.e., Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0: This applies to Example 5 and
Counterexample 3. Because Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) ≥ Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) (see proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C-A), our
proposed M∗NE satisfies Property 5, and is thus non-zero whenever Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0.
Scenarios where non-exempt masked bias is present: This applies to Counterexample 2 and Example 6 (special cases of
the canonical example of non-exempt masked bias, i.e., Example 3). In the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C-A, we show
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that the proposed measure satisfies Property 6 (non-exempt masked bias), and is thus non-zero for these canonical examples of
non-exempt masked bias.
We note that Example 5 is an interesting case where both non-exempt statistically visible bias and non-exempt masked bias
are present. Here, M∗NE is strictly greater than the non-exempt statistically visible bias (Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)), and this difference
can be interpreted as a quantification of the non-exempt masked bias. First notice that,
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) (a)= I(Z; Yˆ ) = H(Z)−H(Z|Yˆ ) = H(Z)−H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2) = 1−
3
4
hb(1/3) bits. (6)
The full derivation is in Supporting Derivation 4 in Appendix C-B. Here hb(·) is the binary entropy function [79] given by
hb(p) = −p log2(p)− (1−p) log2(1−p) and (a) holds because I(Z;UX1) = 0, implying Red(Z : (Yˆ , UX1)) = 0 as well. Now,
we will examine the value of Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) for different choices of Ua to find the minimum. The full derivation
for all of these cases is in Supporting Derivation 4 in Appendix C-B. Here, we only mention the key step. Let Ua = φ (and
Ub = UX ). Then,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX1 , UX2)|UX1)
(a)
= I(Z;UX1 + Z + UX2 , UX1 , UX2) = 1 bit. (7)
Here (a) holds again because I(Z;UX1) = 0, implying the redundant information is 0 as well (using (2) in Section II-A). Next,
for Ua = UX2 (and Ub = UX1 ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX2) : (Yˆ , UX1)|UX1)
(a)
= I((Z,UX2); (Yˆ , UX1)) = 3/2 bit. (8)
Here (a) holds again because I((Z,UX2);UX1) = 0, implying the redundant information is 0 as well. Next, for Ua = UX1 (and
Ub = UX2 ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX1) : (Yˆ , UX2)|UX1)
(b)
= I((Z,UX1); (Yˆ , UX2) | UX1) = 1 bit. (9)
Here (b) holds because Syn((Z,UX1) : (A,B)) = 0 if one of the terms A or B is a deterministic function of (Z,UX1) (using
Lemma 14 in Appendix B) and hence unique information becomes equal to the conditional mutual information (see (3) in
Section II-A). Lastly, for Ua = UX (and Ub = φ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX1 , UX2) : Yˆ |UX1)
(b)
= I((Z,UX1 , UX2); Yˆ | UX1) = 3/2 bit. (10)
Here (b) holds again using Lemma 14 in Appendix B. Thus, we obtain that,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 1 bit,
which is strictly greater than Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 1 − 34hb(1/3) bits, accounting for both non-exempt statistically visible and
non-exempt masked biases.
As noted in Remark 5, our properties are insufficient to arrive at a unique functional form for the measure of non-exempt
bias. It is easiest to understand this issue by contrasting it with Shannon’s discussion on entropy as a measure for uncertainty.
First, we do not have a counterpart of “additivity” of entropy (see Property 3 in Section 6 of [74]) which allows Shannon to
arrive at the logarithmic scaling in entropy. Second, we also do not provide an operational meaning for this measure (such as
that provided by the lossless source coding theorem for entropy [79]), which further supports the logarithmic scaling. This is
a direction of meaningful future work (further functional generalizations discussed in Section VIII). We note that this is the
case with almost all existing measures of fairness (with the notable exceptions of [25], [68], [76]). Exploring more deeply the
desirable attributes of the influence of a virtual constituent or proxy of Z that influences the model output and that cannot be
attributed to the critical features Xc alone (inspired from the work on proxy-use [22]) could be a starting point towards deriving
an exact operational meaning for our proposed measure. Nonetheless, our measure does satisfy all six desirable properties, and
also captures important nuances of the problem, e.g., both non-exempt masked bias and non-exempt statistically visible bias
when they are present together (revisited in Section IV). Our examples also help us understand the utility and limitations of
some existing measures that have some provision for exemptions, as we discuss next.
C. Understanding Existing Measures of Fairness with Provision for Exemptions
• Conditional Statistical Parity: This definition [55], [57] is equivalent to I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = 0. Therefore, it has similar
utility and limitations as Candidate Measure 1 (I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)). It resolves some limitations of both statistical parity and
equalized odds. However, it gives a false positive conclusion in detecting non-exempt bias in Counterexample 1 (the
example of counterfactually fair college admissions), where there is no causal influence of Z on Yˆ but I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0.
Because this is an observational measure, it is not able to distinguish between scenarios where there is causal influence of
Z on Yˆ (non-exempt masked bias in housing ads; Counterexample 2) and where there is not (Counterexample 1), even if
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0 in both (elaborated further in relation to our impossibility result in Remark 11 Section V). It also fails
to capture non-exempt masked bias when the mask arises from the non-critical features as in Example 6.
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Fig. 7: Overall decomposition of total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , Xc)) into four non-negative components, namely, non-exempt visible bias
MV,NE , exempt visible bias MV,E , non-exempt masked bias MM,NE and exempt masked bias MM,E .
• Path-Specific Counterfactual Fairness: Path-specific counterfactual fairness [21] is a purely causal notion of fairness
which exempts the causal influence of Z along selected paths. Based on this idea, we proposed Candidate Measure 3 in
Section III-B. However, Counterexample 3 (the example of discrimination by unmasking) captures some of its limitations,
when there is synergistic or joint information about Z present in Xc and Xg that appears in Yˆ that cannot be attributed to
any one of them alone. Furthermore, sometimes the influence of Z can cancel along two paths so that the final output has no
influence of Z, e.g., the example in Remark 7. For such scenarios, this measure alone can lead to false positive conclusions
about non-exempt bias, and might need to be used in conjunction with a measure of total bias (e.g., CCI(Z → Yˆ )).
• Justifiable Fairness: A model is said to be justifiably fair [56] if I(Z; Yˆ | Xs) = 0 for all sets Xs ⊆ X such that Xc ⊆ Xs.
This measure addresses several concerns of the previously stated measures, including capturing several forms of non-exempt
masked bias. However, it also gives false positive conclusion in Counterexample 1 (the example of counterfactually fair
college admissions), which shows no causal influence of Z on Yˆ but I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0. Because this is an observational
measure, it is not able to distinguish between scenarios where there is causal influence of Z on Yˆ and where there is not,
even if I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0 in both (elaborated further in relation to our impossibility result in Remark 11 Section V).
Another limitation of such an individual feature-based conditioning arises when the causal effects of both Z and an
independent latent factor are present in the same feature, e.g., different digits of a zip-code, and it is not known in advance
whether to condition on the entire zip-code or its sub-portions like the individual digits.
Example 7. Let Xg = [Z,UX1 ] be a single multivariate feature, e.g., two bits of a number and Xc = φ, and the output
be Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 where Z and UX1 are i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
In this example, as long as one treats Xg as a single feature, the model will be deemed justifiably fair because
I(Z; Yˆ | Xg) = 0 and I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0. But, this is a case of non-exempt masked bias. It is necessary to have an advance
suspicion of this possible nature of the true SCM to be able to condition on the two bits of Xg separately. This definition
captures the non-exempt masked bias in this example if the sub-portions of any single feature are defined in advance.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE OVERALL DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we demonstrate how our proposed quantification enables a non-negative information-theoretic decomposition
of the total bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) into four components, that can be interpreted as: statistically visible non-exempt bias, statistically
visible exempt bias, masked non-exempt bias and masked exempt bias (also see Fig. 7).
Theorem 2 (Non-negative Decomposition of Total Bias). The total bias can be decomposed into four components as follows:
I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = MV,NE +MV,E +MM,NE +MM,E . (11)
Here MV,NE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) and MV,E = Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)). These two terms add to form I(Z; Yˆ ) which is the total
statistically visible bias. Next, MM,NE = M∗NE−MV,NE where M∗NE is our proposed measure of non-exempt bias (Definition 7),
and MM,E = I(Z; Yˆ , UX)− I(Z; Yˆ )−MM,NE . All of these components are non-negative.
The decomposition of total bias into a summation of these four terms is trivial. What remains to be shown is that these four
terms are non-negative (details provided in Appendix D-A).
Interpretation of the four components:
Here MV,NE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) can be interpreted as the non-exempt statistically visible bias (as also motivated in
Section III-B). The remaining part of the statistically visible bias (recall Definition 5), i.e., I(Z; Yˆ ) − Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) =
Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) then becomes the exempt statistically visible bias (MV,E). This also agrees with the intuition that the
redundant information about Z statistically visible in both Yˆ and Z represents the exempt statistically visible bias.
FAIRNESS UNDER FEATURE EXEMPTIONS: COUNTERFACTUAL AND OBSERVATIONAL MEASURES 19
Now that we have a measure of non-exempt bias (M∗NE) and a measure of non-exempt statistically visible bias (MV,NE),
we can interpret their difference as the non-exempt masked bias, i.e., MM,NE = M∗NE −MV,NE = M∗NE −Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc).
It also agrees with the intuition that non-exempt masked bias is the part of non-exempt bias that Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) alone
fails to capture. For instance, recall Counterexample 2 where Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 and Xc = UX1 . Here, I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0, implying
MV,NE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0. But, M∗NE = 1 bit (supporting derivation in Appendix C-A; see the proof of Theorem 1 under
Property 6). Therefore, the non-exempt masked bias MM,NE = M∗NE −MV,NE = 1 bit here, which is in agreement with
our intuition of non-exempt masked bias. Lastly, the remaining component MM,E = I(Z; Yˆ , UX) − I(Z; Yˆ ) −MM,NE is
interpreted as the exempt masked bias. For instance, recall Counterexample 4 where Yˆ = Xc = Z + UX1 with Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d.
Bern(1/2). Here, the total bias I(Z; Yˆ , UX) = 1 bit, but the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0.5 bits which means that there is
masked bias present. Our intuition is that this masked bias should be entirely exempt because there is no non-exempt bias in
this example. This is in agreement with the value that we obtain, i.e., MM,E = I(Z; Yˆ , UX)− I(Z; Yˆ )−MM,NE = 0.5 bits.
This is because MM,NE and MV,NE are both non-negative sub-components of M∗NE , and M
∗
NE = 0 (from the Markov chain
(Z,UX1 , UX2)−Xc − Yˆ )).
Remark 9 (On conditioning to capture masked bias). Conditioning on a random variable G leading to I(Z; Yˆ | G) > I(Z; Yˆ )
can sometimes detect masked bias, if conditioning exposes more bias than what was already visible. For example, I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)
can detect masked bias if the mask is of the form g(Xc), e.g., in Counterexample 2 (a special case of the canonical example of
masking with Xc = UX1 and Yˆ = Z⊕UX1 ). However, conditioning on any random variable G leading to I(Z; Yˆ | G) > I(Z; Yˆ )
cannot always be interpreted as a case of masked bias because this can sometimes lead to a false positive conclusion in detecting
masked bias, e.g., in Counterexample 1 where Yˆ = UX1 and Xc = Z+UX1 . If G is chosen as Xc, then I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > I(Z; Yˆ )
even though there is no bias here at all (recall CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0). For completeness, we therefore include another result here
(Lemma 3) that clarifies when conditioning can correctly capture masked bias.
Lemma 3 (Conditioning to Capture Masked Bias). The following two statements are equivalent:
• Masked bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX))− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0.
• ∃ a random variable G of the form G = g(UX) such that I(Z; Yˆ | G)− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0.
Without knowledge of the true causal model, such a G = g(UX) may be difficult to determine from observational data alone,
because the observational data can be a function of both Z and UX . This serves as the motivation behind our impossibility
result on observational measures, that we state next.
V. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
Theorem 3 (Impossibility of Observational Measures). No observational measure of non-exempt bias simultaneously satisfies
all six desirable properties.
Proof of Theorem 3. Observe the two examples here:
Example 8 (A Case of No Bias). Let Xc = Z ⊕ UX1 , Xg = Z and Yˆ = Xc ⊕ Xg = UX1 where Z and UX1 are both
independent and identically distributed as Bern(1/2).
Example 9 (A Case of Non-Exempt Bias). Let Xc = UX1 , Xg = Z and Yˆ = Xc ⊕Xg = Z ⊕ UX1 where Z and UX1 are
both independent and identically distributed as Bern(1/2).
In Example 8, the influences of Z cancel each other and there is no total bias. So, the non-exempt bias should be zero
by Property 4 (Zero Influence). However, Example 9 is the canonical example of non-exempt masked bias where there is
non-exempt bias present, and hence the non-exempt bias should be non-zero by Property 6 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias). But, for
both of these examples, the joint distribution of the observables (Z,Xc, Xg, Yˆ ) is the same which means that no observational
measure can distinguish between these two cases. This proves the result.
Remark 10 (Alternative Examples). In fact, we can show that no observational measure can satisfy Property 6. Consider a
scenario of no bias given by: Xc = φ, Xg = (Z⊕UX1 , Z) and Yˆ = UX1 . For this example, the Markov chain Z−Xc−(Yˆ , UX1)
holds implying that MNE = 0 by Property 6. Alternatively, consider a scenario of non-exempt bias given by: Xc = φ,
Xg = (UX1 , Z) and Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 which is again a variant of the canonical example of non-exempt masked discrimination.
Let Z and UX1 be independent and identically distributed as Bern(1/2). Then, no purely observational measure can distinguish
between these two scenarios because (Z,Xc, Xg, Yˆ ) have the same joint distribution.
Remark 11 (Revisiting Conditional Statistical Parity and Justifiable Fairness). For both Examples 8 and 9, we observe that
conditional mutual information I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0. Because I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) is an observational measure, it fails to distinguish
between whether there is causal influence of Z or not in Yˆ . Existing observational definitions of fairness, e.g., conditional
statistical parity and justifiable fairness would also not be able to distinguish between these two examples. One needs
counterfactual measures to be able to distinguish between them, such as the counterfactual measure proposed in this work.
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Nevertheless, because counterfactual measures are difficult to realize in practice, we examine the following observational
measures of non-exempt bias that satisfy only a few of Properties 1-6.
VI. OBSERVATIONAL RELAXATIONS OF OUR PROPOSED COUNTERFACTUAL MEASURE: UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we propose three observational measures of non-exempt bias and discuss their utility and limitations.
Observational Measure 1. MNE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc).
Utility: This measure satisfies several desirable properties as stated here:
Lemma 4. [Fairness Properties of Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)] The measure Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) satisfies Properties 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The proof is in Appendix E. Importantly, note that, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) satisfies Property 4 which I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) does not (recall
Counterexample 1). Thus, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) does not give false positive conclusions in detecting non-exempt bias if a model is
counterfactually fair.
This measure may be preferred over our other observational measures when one wants to prioritize avoiding false positive
quantification of non-exempt bias when a model is counterfactually fair. Recall that, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is a measure of non-exempt,
statistically visible bias. It correctly captures the entire non-exempt bias when non-exempt masked bias is absent.
Limitations: It does not quantify any non-exempt masked bias (Property 6). This is because Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is a sub-component
of the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ), and hence always goes to 0 whenever the statistically visible bias I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0 (recall
Example 3). It also does not satisfy Property 1 because when Xc = φ, we have Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = I(Z; Yˆ ), which is only the
statistically visible bias but not the total bias in a counterfactual sense (i.e., I(Z; Yˆ , UX)).
Observational Measure 2. MNE = I(Z; Yˆ | Xc).
Utility: This measure also satisfies several desirable properties, as stated here:
Lemma 5. [Fairness Properties of I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)] The measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) satisfies Properties 3 and 5.
The proof is in Appendix E. We note that, while it does not satisfy Property 6 in its entirely, it does capture some scenarios
of non-exempt masked bias. E.g., it can detect the non-exempt masked bias in Counterexample 2 which Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) is not
able to, even though they both fail to detect the non-exempt masked bias in Example 6. In general, I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) can detect
non-exempt masked bias when the “mask” is entirely derived from the critical features, i.e., G = g(Xc).
Limitations:
It can sometimes lead to false positive conclusion about non-exempt bias, e.g., in Counterexample 1 (does not satisfy
Property 4). It also does not satisfy Property 2 because clearly I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) may be greater or less that I(Z; Yˆ ) (recall
Counterexample 2). It also does not satisfy Property 1 because when Xc = φ, we have I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = I(Z; Yˆ ), which is only
the statistically visible bias but not the total bias in a counterfactual sense (i.e., I(Z; Yˆ , UX)).
Observational Measure 3. MNE = I(Z; Yˆ | Xc, X ′) where X ′ consists of certain features in Xg .
Utility and Limitations: This is somewhat of a heuristic relaxation that only satisfies Property 3. However, while it does
not satisfy any of the other properties in their entirety, it can still lead to the desirable quantification in several examples
where the previous two measures may not be successful if X ′ is chosen appropriately. For example, recall Example 6 where
Yˆ = Z ⊕UX1 with Xg = (Z,UX1). With some partial knowledge or assumption about the SCM, if we choose X ′ = UX1 , then
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc, X ′) > 0 for this example even though I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = 0. Thus, this measure is able to detect some more scenarios
of non-exempt masked bias that I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) cannot, i.e., when the mask is of the form G = g(Xc, X ′). It can also sometimes
avoid false positive quantification of non-exempt bias if X ′ is chosen appropriately, e.g., in Counterexample 1 if X ′ = UX1 .
Thus, under partial knowledge or assumption about the true SCM, this measure can correctly capture the non-exempt bias in
many scenarios where the previous two measures may not be successful.
Lastly, one may also consider using various combinations of these measures, e.g., Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) + I(Z; Yˆ | X ′), or
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)+I(Z; Yˆ | X ′), or Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)+Syn(Z : (Yˆ , X ′)), that can also approximate our proposed measure in several
scenarios if X ′ is chosen appropriately based on partial knowledge or assumptions about the true SCM.
VII. CASE STUDIES DEMONSTRATING PRACTICAL APPLICATION IN TRAINING
Here, we discuss some case studies on both simulated and real data. As a first step in this direction, we will only use one
of our proposed measures, namely, I(Z; Yˆ | Xc), and choose a simple correlation-based estimate for it (elaborated further in
Section VII-A) in this work. In future work, we will explore some extensions of these ideas to estimating unique information,
as well as, some alternate methods of estimation altogether [25], [35], [55], [68], [80], as discussed in Section VIII.
A. Case Study on Simulated Data
Setup: The goal is to decide whether to show ads for an editor job requiring English proficiency, based on whether a score
generated from internet activity is above a threshold. Z ∼ Bern(1/2) is a protected attribute denoting whether a person is
a native English speaker or not. Now, consider three features X = (X1, X2, X3), where Xc = X1 and Xg = (X2, X3): (i)
X1: a score based on online writing samples; (ii) X2: a score based on browsing history, e.g., interest in English websites as
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Fig. 8: Structural causal model corresponding to the simulated case study: The goal is to decide whether to show ads for an
editor job requiring English proficiency, based on three features using logistic regression. The three features are (i) X1: a score
based on online writing samples; (ii) X2: a score based on browsing history, e.g., interest in English websites as compared
to websites of other languages; and (iii) X3: a preference score based on proximity. Z ∼ Bern(1/2) is a protected attribute
denoting whether a person is a native English speaker or not.
compared to websites of other languages; and (iii) X3: a preference score based on geographical proximity. Suppose the true
SCM is as follows (see Fig. 8): X1 = Z + U1, X2 = Z + U2, and X3 = U3 and the historic scores of selected candidates
are S = X1 +X2 +X3 where U1, U2, U3 ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1). Let the historic true labels be given by Y = 1(S ≥ 1) indicating
whether S ≥ 1 or not.
Models trained: We will train a logistic regression model of the form Yˆ = 1/(1 + e−(w
TX+b)). The model produces an
output value Yˆ between 0 and 1. Using this model, one decides to show the ads if Yˆ ≥ 0.5, i.e., if wTX + b ≥ 0. We train
using the following loss functions:
Loss L1 (No Fairness):
min
w,b
LCross Entropy(Y, Yˆ ).
Loss L2 (Mutual Information (MI) Regularizer):
min
w,b
LCross Entropy(Y, Yˆ ) + λ˜I(Z; Yˆ ),
where (i) λ is the regularization constant; and (ii) I˜(Z; Yˆ ) = − 12 log (1− ρ2Z,Yˆ ) is an approximate expression of mutual
information where ρZ,Yˆ is the correlation between Z and Yˆ . This approximation is exact if Z and Yˆ are jointly Gaussian [79].
Loss L3 (Conditional Mutual Information (CMI) Regularizer):
min
w,b
LCross Entropy(Y, Yˆ )+λ˜I(Z; Yˆ | Xc),
where again (i) λ is the regularization constant; and (ii) I˜(Z; Yˆ | Xc) is given by:
I˜(Z; Yˆ | Xc) =
n∑
i=1
Pr(Xc ∈ Bin i)˜I(Z; Yˆ | Xc ∈ Bin i) = −1
2
n∑
i=1
Pr(Xc ∈ Bin i) log (1− ρ2Z,Yˆ ,i),
where the range of Xc is divided into n discrete bins, and ρZ,Yˆ ,i is the conditional correlation of Yˆ and Z given Xc is in the
i-th discrete bin.
Observations (Fig. 9 and Table III): We plot the values of accuracy and non-exempt bias (CMI) in Fig. 9 for the three
different loss functions, by varying the regularization constant λ, wherever applicable. While we only include few values of λ
in Table III for brevity, the plot in Fig. 9 is based on all integer values of λ ranging from 1 to 10 (100 simulations of 7000
iterations each with batch size 200).
Intuition behind the results (Fig. 10): To understand the results better, we specifically look into the histogram of the
predictions for all candidates and the histogram for only those candidates with similar value of the critical feature (e.g.,
Xc ≥ 0.5). For Loss 1, the model learns to place equal weight on all three features, consistent with the historic scores. Thus, it
attains a high accuracy. But, because the historic scores are correlated with browsing history (X2), even when a non-native
speaker has good writing score, they are not be shown an ad due to their browsing history (hence, the high non-exempt bias).
Loss 2 (MI Regularizer) does not work well because the model begins to weigh both X1 and X2 less, and many proficient
candidates are dropped in favour of a less-important feature, namely, proximity (X3), also reducing the accuracy (see Table III).
However, Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer) is able to reduce the importance (weight) of browsing history relative to online writing
scores, leading to an intermediate accuracy between Loss 1 and 2 for same non-exempt bias (also see Fig. 9). In a sense, our
measure enables individuals with similar Xc to be treated similarly.
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Fig. 9: Trade-off between accuracy and non-exempt bias (CMI): For Loss 1 (No Fairness), the trained model achieves high
accuracy but also has high non-exempt bias (CMI). For both Loss 2 (MI Regularizer) and Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer), the
non-exempt bias reduces, but so does accuracy. But, Loss 3 achieves a much better trade-off between accuracy and non-exempt
bias than Loss 2. For instance, Loss 3 (with λ = 7) achieves 84.07% accuracy while Loss 2 (with λ = 4) achieves only 81.00%
while attaining the same value of non-exempt bias (CMI). λ takes all integer values from 1 to 10.
TABLE III: Observations after training a logistic regression model (Yˆ = 1/(1 + e−(w
TX+b))) using three loss functions with
different fairness criteria (100 simulations of 7000 iterations each with batch size 200).
Setup λ Accuracy (SD.) CMI (SD.) −w1
b
(SD.) −w2
b
(SD.) −w3
b
(SD.)
Loss L1 N.A. 98.46 (0.10) 0.0703 (0.004) 1.083 (0.003) 1.083 (0.003) 1.075 (0.003)
Loss L2
λ = 1 95.82 (0.27) 0.0542 (0.004) 1.108 (0.006) 1.108 (0.006) 1.449 (0.018)
λ = 2 91.31 (0.38) 0.0386 (0.003) 1.118 (0.01) 1.119 (0.01) 1.954 (0.052)
λ = 5 76.87 (0.005) 0.0072 (0.0012) 1.038 (0.0311) 1.034 (0.0312) 5.183 (0.1441)
λ = 10 70.17 (0.67) 0.0011 (0.0005) 0.9957 (0.1372) 0.9990 (0.1518) 13.9077 (0.9882)
Loss L3
λ = 1 97.04 (0.20) 0.0580 (0.004) 1.154 (0.005) 1.037 (0.003) 1.294 (0.009)
λ = 2 94.52 (0.29) 0.0467 (0.003) 1.243 (0.0109) 0.962 (0.004) 1.511 (0.0180)
λ = 5 87.57 (0.34) 0.0219 (0.002) 1.563 (0.0195) 0.602 (0.0145) 2.0685 (0.0287)
λ = 10 80.76 (0.50) 0.0062 (0.0011) 2.0495 (0.0272) 0.0235 (0.0248) 2.5695 (0.0339)
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Fig. 10: Histogram of model outputs for a particular value of λ = 10: (Left) p(Yˆ = y | Z = z) for z = 0, 1; (Right)
p(Yˆ = y | Xc ≥ 0.5, Z = z) for z = 0, 1. Loss 2 (MI Regularizer) brings p(Yˆ = y | Z = z) closer for Z=0 and 1 by placing
higher weight on a less important feature (proximity score). But this distorts the histograms significantly and reduces the
accuracy (see Table III). Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer) still retains some biases in the overall histogram (p(Yˆ = y | Z = z)), and
only brings p(Yˆ = y|Xc≥0.5, Z = z) approach each other for z = 0 and 1, so that candidates with similar critical feature Xc
are treated similarly and not discriminated any further based on Z.
B. Case Study on Real Data: Adult Dataset
Setup: The Adult dataset [81], also known as the Census income dataset, consists of 14 features such as age, educational
qualification, etc., and the prediction goal is to predict whether the income is greater than 50K. This dataset is widely used
in existing fairness literature (see [26]), because such data might be representative of the data used in highly consequential
applications, such as, lending, showing expensive ads, etc. In this work, we choose gender as the protected attribute (Z) in the
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Adult dataset. Our set of input features (X) consist of all the other features except gender, and our critical feature (Xc) is
hours-per-week.
Models trained: We train a deep neural network (multi-layer perceptron) on this dataset. The model takes all the features
except gender as input (with one hot encoding of all categorical variables). The input layer is followed by three hidden layers,
each having 32 neurons with ReLu activation and dropout probability 0.2. Finally, the output layer consists of a single neuron
with sigmoid activation that produces an output value between 0 and 1 (denoting likelihood of acceptance). We again define the
three loss functions as before: (i) only binary cross-entropy loss with no fairness criterion; (ii) binary cross-entropy loss with
Mutual Information (MI) regularizer; and (iii) binary cross-entropy loss with Conditional Mutual Information (CMI) regularizer.
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Fig. 11: Trade-off between accuracy/AUC and non-exempt bias (CMI): For Loss 1 (No Fairness), the trained model achieves
high accuracy but also has high non-exempt bias (CMI). For both Loss 2 (MI Regularizer) and Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer), the
non-exempt bias reduces, but so does accuracy. But, Loss 3 achieves a much better trade-off between accuracy and non-exempt
bias than Loss 2. Interestingly, we note that, as we increase the value of the regularization constant (λ), the non-exempt bias
(CMI) for Loss 2 begins to increase after a point. This is because we enter into a “high-synergy” regime where CMI is higher
than MI, and MI still decreases but without decreasing CMI (more intuition in Fig. 12).
Observations (Fig. 11): Similar to the previous case study, we plot the values of accuracy/AUC and non-exempt bias (CMI)
in Fig. 11 for the three different loss functions by varying the regularization constant (λ) wherever applicable. The plot is based
on λ = 1, 2, 4, 6 (averaged over 40 simulations of 300 epochs each with batch-size 1000).
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Fig. 12: Histogram of model outputs for a particular value of λ = 4: (Left) p(Yˆ = y | Z = z) for z = 0, 1; (Right)
p(Yˆ = y | Xc < 20, Z = z) for z = 0, 1. Loss 2 (MI Regularizer) brings p(Yˆ = y | Z = z) closer for Z=0 and 1. But
this introduces some reverse bias among candidates with similar value of critical feature. Here CMI>MI, and non-exempt
bias (CMI) persists even though MI is significantly reduced. Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer) still retains some biases in the overall
histogram (p(Yˆ = y | Z = z)), but it brings p(Yˆ = y|Xc<20, Z = z) approach each other for z = 0 and 1, so that candidates
with similar critical feature Xc are treated similarly and not discriminated any further based on Z.
Intuition behind results (Fig. 12): To understand the results better, we again specifically look into the histogram of the
predictions for all candidates and the histogram for only those candidates with similar value of the critical feature (e.g.,
Xc < 20). For Loss 1, the overall predictions have bias, but predictions for similar Xc are less biased (i.e., MI > CMI). Using
Loss 2 (MI Regularizer), the overall statistically visible bias goes away, but when the histogram of candidates with similar
value of critical feature are examined specifically, we notice a “reverse” bias introduced. Thus, CMI is quite higher than MI,
i.e., non-exempt bias (CMI) persists even though MI is significantly reduced (statistical parity is almost attained). However,
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Loss 3 (CMI Regularizer) is able to selectively reduce the non-exempt bias in the overall predictions, while attempting to treat
candidates with similar Xc similarly irrespective of their gender.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
On Choice of Critical Features and Connections with Explainability: In this work, as also in some existing works on
fairness [19], [44], we assume that the critical features are known. We adopt a viewpoint stated in [48] which suggests that
“We can’t just rely on the math; we still need a human person applying human judgements.” Since most of these exemptions
are embedded in law and social science [43], [45]–[47], we believe that fairness researchers need to collaborate with social
scientists and lawyers in order to determine which set of features can be designated as critical for a particular application.
This work also shares close connections with the field of explainability in machine learning [17], [64], [82], and motivates
several related research problems, e.g., how to check or explain if certain features contributed to the bias in a model, or how to
incorporate exemptions in applications, such as, image processing, where certain neurons in an intermediate hidden layer might
need to be exempted instead of the input layer because they often have more interpretability [82].
On Better Understanding of Observational Measures: Our proposed counterfactual measure and the desirable properties
help in evaluation of observational measures in practice, and understand their utility and limitation, i.e., what they capture and
miss. Finally, in applications where when the true SCM is known or can be evaluated from the data [50, Chapters 4,7], the
proposed measure exactly captures the non-exempt bias.
On Uniqueness, Operational Meaning and Further Generalizations: We acknowledge that we do not prove uniqueness
of our measure with respect to the desirable properties, and neither do we show that the properties are exhaustive (recall
Remark 5 in Section III-B). This is an interesting direction of future work. However, there may also be value in the fact that the
properties do not yield a unique measure: this allows for tuning the measure based on the application. E.g., Shannon established
uniqueness on entropy with respect to some properties in [74] but subsequent applications have still led to the use of modified
measures, e.g. Renyi entropy [25], [68], [75], [76].
Deriving the exact operational meaning of our proposed counterfactual measure is also an interesting direction of future work.
Nonetheless, the proposed measure does satisfy our stated desirable properties and capture important aspects of the problem,
e.g., statistically visible and masked biases. Furthermore, our measure can also be modified to account for further functional
generalizations.
First notice, that our proposed Property 6 is a special case of the following statement:
If (Z, fa(UX))−Xc−(Yˆ , fb(UX)) form a Markov chain for any deterministic functions fa(·) and fb(·) such that fa(UX) ⊥
fb(UX) and H(UX)=H(fa(UX)) + H(fb(UX)), then MNE=0.
To account for this more general property, our proposed measure might be modified as follows:
min
fa(UX),fb(UX)
Uni((Z, fa(UX)) : (Yˆ , fb(UX))|Xc), (12)
such that fa(UX) ⊥ fb(UX) and H(UX) = H(fa(UX)) + H(fb(UX)). This measure also satisfies all the other desirable
properties. In this work, we restrict ourselves to fa(UX) and fb(UX) being disjoint subsets of UX for simplicity, computability
and ease of understanding. Future work will explore how different assumptions on the SCM restrict the class of fa and fb.
On Understanding Other Forms of Masked Bias: Let us revisit the discussion from Section III-B that not all forms
of masked discrimination are necessarily undesirable. E.g., if UX1 is a random coin flip in Example 3, then performing
Yˆ = Z ⊕UX1 randomizes the race, and can even be regarded as a preventive measure against discrimination. However, keeping
the mathematics of the example same, if UX1 instead denotes whether one’s income is above a threshold, then the model is
unfair. It is an interesting future direction to examine how to quantify non-exempt discrimination while allowing the user with
more flexibility on what latent factors are allowed to mask Z.
On Estimation of Mutual Information, Conditional Mutual Information and Unique Information: In general, it is
difficult to directly incorporate these information-theoretic measures as a regularizer with the loss function (see [80], [83] and
the references therein). In this work, as a first step, we used a simple correlation-based estimate for mutual and conditional
mutual information under a Gaussian assumption. We believe that similar ideas can be extended to unique information as
well under Gaussian assumptions, building on [84]. Examining alternate methods of incorporating our proposed measures as
regularizer (using or building upon techniques proposed in [25], [35], [55], [68], [80]) is an interesting direction of future work.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTERFACTUAL CAUSAL INFLUENCE (CCI) AND ITS CONNECTION TO COUNTERFACTUAL FAIRNESS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Here, we first provide a proof of Lemma 1 which shows that our proposed quantification of total bias is zero if and only if
CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0. For ease of reading, we repeat the statement of the lemma here again.
Lemma 1 (Equivalences of CCI). Consider the aforementioned system model. Let Yˆ = h(Z,UX) for some deterministic
function h(·) and Z ⊥ UX . Then, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 if and only if I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. From the definition of CCI (Definition 3 in Section II-B),
CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = EZ,Z′,UX [|h(Z,UX)− h(Z ′, UX)|]
=
∑
z1,z2,ux
Pr(Z = z1, Z
′ = z2, UX = ux)|h(z1, ux)− h(z2, ux)|
=
∑
z1,z2,ux
Pr(Z = z1) Pr(Z
′ = z2) Pr(UX = ux)|h(z1, ux)− h(z2, ux)| [from independence]. (13)
The summation consist of non-negative terms. Therefore, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0, if and only if all the terms in the summation
are zero, i.e., for all z1, z2 and ux with Pr(Z = z1),Pr(Z = z2),Pr(UX = ux) > 0, |h(z1, ux) − h(z2, ux)| = 0. This is
equivalent to h(z, ux) being constant over all possible values of z with Pr(Z = z) > 0 given a fixed value of ux, and this
should happen over all values of ux with Pr(UX = ux).
Now, observe that,
I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = I(Z; Yˆ | UX) + I(Z;UX) (14)
= I(Z; Yˆ | UX) [Z ⊥ UX ] (15)
= H(Yˆ | UX)−H(Yˆ | UX , Z) [By Definition] (16)
= H(Yˆ | UX). [Yˆ is completely determined by Z and UX ] (17)
H(Yˆ | UX) can be 0 if and only if h(z, ux) is constant over all possible values of z with Pr(Z = z) > 0 given a fixed value of
ux, and this should happen over all ux with Pr(UX = ux) > 0. Thus, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 if and only if I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0.
B. Connections to Counterfactual Fairness
We note that the concept of counterfactual causal influence (often referred to as only “influence”) is derived from a separate
body of work [63]–[67]) outside the fairness literature. The original definition of counterfactual fairness in [18] was stated
differently (without using CCI), although the connection with CCI has been hinted at in [20]. Here, for the sake of completeness,
we will formally show in Lemma 6 that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to the counterfactual fairness criterion proposed in
[18]. What this means is that, our proposed quantification of total bias is also 0 if and only if a model is counterfactually fair.
First, we clarify the differences in notation between our work and [18]. In our work, X = f(Z,UX) and Yˆ = r(X) =
r ◦ f(Z,UX) = h(Z,UX) where h = r ◦ f . In [18], YˆZ←z1(U) denotes the random variable Yˆ when the value of Z is fixed as
z1 by an intervention, i.e., YˆZ←z1(U) = h(z1, UX). Alongside, we also clarify that the event that X takes the value x when Z
is fixed as z1 refers to the event that UX takes a value from the set S(x, z1) = {ux : x = f(z1, ux), Pr(UX = ux) > 0}
because X = f(Z,UX).
Definition 8 (Counterfactual Fairness given X = x and Z = z1 [18]). A predictor Yˆ is counterfactually fair given the protected
attribute Z = z1 and the observed variable X = x, if we have,
Pr(YˆZ←z1(U) = y | X takes the value x when Z is fixed as z1)
= Pr(YˆZ←z2(U) = y | X takes the value x when Z is fixed as z1), (18)
for all attainable y and z2. In our notations, this definition is equivalent to the following: Given the sensitive attribute Z = z1
and the observed variable X = x,
Pr(h(z1, UX) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)) = Pr(h(z2, UX)) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)), (19)
for all attainable y and z2, where S(x, z1) = {ux : x = f(z1, ux), Pr(UX = ux) > 0}.
Next, we show that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to the counterfactual fairness criterion of [18].
Lemma 6. CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to counterfactual fairness (Definition 8) for all X = x and Z = z1 with
Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that, CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0. Recall from Lemma 1, that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to the
criterion that h(z1, ux) = h(z2, ux) for all attainable z1, z2 given a particular value of ux, and this should hold for all ux with
Pr(UX = ux) > 0. Therefore, for any particular X = x and Z = z1 with Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0,
Pr(h(z1, UX) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)) = Pr(h(z2, UX)) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)), (20)
because h(z1, ux) = h(z2, ux) for all ux ∈ S(x, z1). Thus, we show that CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 implies counterfactual fairness.
Now, we prove the implication in the other direction. Suppose that the counterfactual fairness criterion (19) holds for all
X = x and Z = z1 with Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0.
First consider any particular X = x and Z = z1 with Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0. Since Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0, there exists
at least one ux with Pr(UX = ux) > 0 such that x = f(z1, ux). So, the set S(x, z1) is non-empty. Equation (19) implies that,
Pr(h(z1, UX) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)) = Pr(h(z2, UX)) = y | UX ∈ S(x, z1)) ∀ attainable y, z2. (21)
This leads to,
Pr(h(z1, UX) = y, UX ∈ S(x, z1)) = Pr(h(z2, UX) = y, UX ∈ S(x, z1)) ∀ attainable y, z2. (22)
Or, ∑
ux∈S(x,z1)
Pr(UX = ux)1(h(z1, ux) = y) =
∑
ux∈S(x,z1)
Pr(UX = ux)1(h(z2, ux) = y) ∀ attainable y, z2. (23)
Now, observe that, f(z1, ux) = x for all ux ∈ S(x, z1), and thus h(z1, ux) = r ◦ f(z1, ux) takes the same value for all
ux ∈ S(x, z1). Let h(z1, ux) = y˜ for all ux ∈ S(x, z1). Then, for (23) to hold, we need,∑
ux∈S(x,z1)
Pr(UX = ux)(1− 1(h(z2, ux) = y˜)) = 0 ∀ attainable z2.
This holds if and only if 1(h(z2, ux) = y˜) = 1 for all ux ∈ S(x, z1) and for all attainable z2. Thus, the counterfactual fairness
criterion (19) for a particular X = x, Z = z1 with Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0 implies that for all ux ∈ S(x, z1),
h(z2, ux) = h(z1, ux) ∀ attainable z2. (24)
Because the counterfactual criterion (19) holds for all X = x, Z = z1 with Pr(X = x, Z = z1) > 0, we therefore have (24)
hold for all
ux ∈ ∪{x,z1:Pr(X=x,Z=z1)>0}S(x, z1).
Now, because UX is independent of Z, for any u∗x with Pr(UX = u
∗
x) > 0, there always exists some x
∗ such that
x∗ = f(z1, u∗x), and Pr(X = x
∗, Z = z1) ≥ Pr(UX = u∗x, Z = z1) > 0. Thus, u∗x ∈ S(x∗, z1) for some (x∗, z1) with
Pr(X = x∗, Z = z1) > 0. Thus,
{ux : Pr(UX = ux) > 0} ⊆ ∪{x,z1:Pr(X=x,Z=z1)>0}S(x, z1),
implying that h(z2, ux) = h(z1, ux) for all attainable z1, z2 given a particular value of ux, and this holds for all ux with
Pr(UX = ux) > 0. This is equivalent to CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 (recall Lemma 1).
APPENDIX B
RELEVANT INFORMATION-THEORETIC PROPERTIES
Lemma 7 (Conditional DPI). For all (A,A′, B,Xc) such that (B,Xc)−A−A′ form a Markov chain, we have the following
conditional form of the Data Processing Inequality (DPI): I(A;B | Xc) ≥ I(A′;B | Xc).
Proof of Lemma 7. From the Markov chain, we have I(A′; (B,Xc) | A) = 0. Because, I(A′; (B,Xc) | A) = I(A′;Xc | A) +
I(A′;B | A,Xc) by chain rule and mutual information is non-negative, we also have I(A′;B | A,Xc) = 0. Now, similar to the
proof of DPI, we have:
I(A′;B | Xc) + I(A;B | A′, Xc) = I(A;B | Xc) + I(A′;B | A,Xc) = I(A;B | Xc), (25)
because I(A′;B | A,Xc) = 0. This leads to I(A;B | Xc) ≥ I(A′;B | Xc).
Lemma 8 (Triangle Inequality of Unique Information). For all (Z,B,A,Xc), we have:
Uni(Z : A|Xc) ≤ Uni(Z : A|B) + Uni(Z : B|Xc).
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This result is derived in [85, Proposition 2].
Lemma 9 (Monotonicity under local operations on Z). Let Z ′ = f(Z) where f(·) is a deterministic function. Then, we have:
Uni(Z : B|Xc) ≥ Uni(Z ′ : B|Xc).
This result is derived in [73, Lemma 31]. We include a proof for completeness.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let P ′ be the true joint distribution of (Z ′, B,Xc) and P be the true joint distribution of (Z,B,Xc). Also
let Q∗ = arg minQ∈∆P IQ(Z;B | Xc) where ∆P is the set of all joint distributions of (Z,B,Xc) with the same marginals
between (Z,B) and (Z,Xc) as the true joint distribution P . Let us also define
Q′∗(z′, b, xc) =
∑
z
Pr(z′ | z)Q∗(z, b, xc),
where Pr(z′ | z) is the true conditional distribution of Z ′ = f(Z) given Z.
Now, observe that,
Uni(Z : B|Xc) = min
Q∈∆P
IQ(Z;B | Xc) [By Definition of Unique Information]
= IQ∗(Z;B | Xc) [By Definition of Q∗]
(a)
≥ IQ′∗(Z ′;B | Xc)
(b)
≥ min
Q′∈∆P ′
IQ′(Z
′;B | Xc)
= Uni(Z ′ : B|Xc) [By Definition of Unique Information]. (26)
Here (a) holds using the conditional form of the Data Processing inequality (Lemma 7) as follows. Consider the random
variables (Z,B,Xc) following distribution Q∗ and Z ′ = f(Z). Then, (B,Xc)− Z − Z ′ form a Markov chain. Also note that
(b) holds because Q′∗ belongs to ∆P ′ which is the set of all joint distributions of (Z ′, B,Xc) with the same marginals between
(Z ′, B) and (Z ′, Xc) as the true joint distribution P ′.
Lemma 10 (Monotonicity under local operations on B). Let B′ = f(B) where f(·) is a deterministic function. Then, we have:
Uni(Z : B|Xc) ≥ Uni(Z : B′|Xc).
This result is derived in [73, Lemma 31]. We include a proof for completeness.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let P ′ be the true joint distribution of (Z,B′, Xc) and P be the true joint distribution of (Z,B,Xc). Also
let Q∗ = arg minQ∈∆P IQ(Z;B | Xc) where ∆P is the set of all joint distributions of (Z,B,Xc) with the same marginals
between (Z,B) and (Z,Xc) as the true joint distribution P . Let us also define
Q′∗(z, b′, xc) =
∑
b
Pr(b′ | b)Q∗(z, b, xc),
where Pr(b′ | b) is the true conditional distribution of B′ = f(B) given B.
Now, observe that,
Uni(Z : B|Xc) = min
Q∈∆P
IQ(Z;B | Xc) [By Definition of Unique Information]
= IQ∗(Z;B | Xc) [By Definition of Q∗]
(a)
≥ IQ′∗(Z;B′ | Xc)
(b)
≥ min
Q′∈∆P ′
IQ′(Z;B
′ | Xc)
= Uni(Z : B′|Xc) [By Definition of Unique Information]. (27)
Here (a) holds using the conditional form of the Data Processing inequality (Lemma 7) as follows. Consider the random
variables (Z,B,Xc) following distribution Q∗ and B′ = f(B). Then, (Z,Xc)−B −B′ form a Markov chain. Also note that
(b) holds because Q′∗ belongs to ∆P ′ which is the set of all joint distributions of (Z,B′, Xc) with the same marginals between
(Z,B′) and (Z,Xc) as the true joint distribution P ′.
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Lemma 11 (Monotonicity under adversarial side information). For all (A,B,Xc, X ′c), we have:
Uni(A : B|(Xc, X ′c)) ≤ Uni(A : B|Xc).
This result is derived in [73, Lemma 32].
Lemma 12 (Maximal conditional mutual information). Let A = f(Z,UX) where Z ⊥ UX and B = g(UX) for some
deterministic functions f(·) and g(·) respectively. Then,
I(Z;A | UX) ≥ I(Z;A | B). (28)
Proof of Lemma 12. Observe that,
I(Z;UX | A,B)) ≥ 0 [non-negativity property]
=⇒ H(Z | A,B)−H(Z | A,B,UX) ≥ 0 [by definition]
=⇒ H(Z | A,B)−H(Z | A,UX) ≥ 0 [B = g(UX)]
=⇒ H(Z)−H(Z | A,UX) ≥ H(Z)−H(Z | A,B)
=⇒ H(Z | UX)−H(Z | A,UX) ≥ H(Z | B)−H(Z | A,B) [Z ⊥ UX and Z ⊥ B]
=⇒ I(Z;A | UX) ≥ I(Z;A | B). (29)
Lemma 13 (Absence of counterfactual causal influence). Let Yˆ = h(Z,UX) where Z ⊥ UX and Xc = g(Z,UX) for
some deterministic functions h(·) and g(·) respectively. Then CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 implies Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) = 0 and also
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 13. CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 is equivalent to I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0 (using Lemma 1). Now,
Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc)
(a)
≤ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0,
where (a) holds from (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID. Also,
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)
(a)
≤ I(Z; Yˆ )
(b)
≤ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0,
where (a) holds from (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID terms, and (b) holds from the chain rule and non-negativity
of mutual information.
Lemma 14 (Zero-synergy property of deterministic functions). Let f(Z) be any deterministic function of Z, and let Xc be
any random variable. Then,
Syn(Z : (f(Z), Xc)) = Syn(Z : (Xc, f(Z))) = 0. (30)
This leads to Uni(Z : f(Z)|Xc) = I(Z; f(Z)|Xc) and Uni(Z : Xc|f(Z)) = I(Z;Xc|f(Z)).
Proof of Lemma 14:. Recall from the definition of Uni(Z : B|Xc) that ∆ denotes the set of all joint distributions of (Z,B,Xc)
and ∆p is the set of all such joint distributions that have the same marginals for (Z,B) and (Z,Xc) as the true distribution, i.e.,
∆p = {Q ∈ ∆ : q(z, b) = Pr(Z = z,B = b) and q(z, xc) = Pr(Z = z,Xc = xc)}. (31)
We first show that if B = f(Z), then ∆p is only a singleton set which only consists of the true distribution.
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Observe that, for any Q ∈ ∆p,
q(z, b, xc) = q(z)q(b|z)q(xc|b, z) [chain rule of probability]
= Pr(Z = z) Pr(B = b|Z = z)q(xc|b, z) [q(z, b) = Pr(Z = z,B = b)]
=
{
Pr(Z = z)q(xc|b, z), if b = f(z)
0, otherwise
[Pr(B = b|Z = z) = 1 only if b = f(z)]
=
{
Pr(Z = z)q(xc|z), if b = f(z)
0, otherwise
[b is entirely determined by z]
=
{
Pr(Z = z) Pr(Xc = xc|Z = z), if y = f(z)
0, otherwise
[q(xc|z) = Pr(Xc = xc|Z = z)]
= Pr(Z = z,B = b,Xc = xc). (32)
Thus, for B = f(Z),
Uni(Z : B|Xc) = min
Q∈∆p
IQ(Z;B|Xc) = I(Z;B|Xc). (33)
This leads to Syn(Z : (f(Z), Xc)) = I(Z; f(Z)|Xc) − Uni(Z : f(Z)|Xc) = 0 (using (3) in Section II-A). Note that,
Syn(Z : (f(Z), Xc)) is symmetric between f(Z) and Xc.
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO SECTION III
Here, we provide the proofs of the results as well as additional discussion to supplement Section III. For convenience, we
repeat the statements of the results.
A. Proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2
Theorem 1 (Properties). Properties 1-6 are satisfied by our proposed measure
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) such that Ua = UX\Ub.
Proof of Theorem 1. Here, we formally show that our proposed measure satisfies all the four desirable properties. We restate
each of the properties again and then show that they are is satisfied.
Property 1 (Absence of Exemptions). If the set of critical features, Xc = φ, then a measure MNE should be equal to the
total bias, i.e., I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)).
When Xc = φ, we have Uni(Z,Ua : Yˆ , Ub|Xc) = I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub). We are required to show that minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub)
is equal to I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)). Note that,
I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub) = H(Yˆ , Ub)−H(Yˆ , Ub | Z,Ua) [By Definition]
= H(Yˆ | Ub) + H(Ub)−H(Ub | Z,Ua)−H(Yˆ | Ub, Z, Ua) [Chain Rule]
= H(Yˆ | Ub) + H(Ub)−H(Ub | Z,Ua) [Yˆ is entirely determined by Z,Ua, Ub]
= H(Yˆ | Ub) [Z,Ua, Ub are mutually independent]
≥ H(Yˆ | UX) [conditioning reduces entropy]
= H(Yˆ | UX)−H(Yˆ | Z,UX) + I(Z;UX) [Yˆ entirely determined by Z,UX , and Z ⊥ UX ]
= I(Z; Yˆ | UX) + I(Z;UX) [By Definition]
= I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)). [By Chain Rule] (34)
Thus, I(Z,Ua; Yˆ , Ub) ≥ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) with equality when Ub = UX , Ua = φ.
Property 2 (Non-Increasing with More Exemptions). For a fixed set of features X and a fixed model Yˆ = h(Z,UX), a measure
MNE should be non-increasing if a feature is removed from Xg and added to Xc.
Let X ′c denote the additional feature that is to be removed from Xg and is to be added to Xc. From Lemma 11, we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|(Xc, X ′c)) ≤ Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc), (35)
for any Ua, Ub. Thus,
min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|(Xc, X ′c)) ≤ min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc). (36)
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Property 3 (Complete Exemption). MNE should be 0 if all features are exempt, i.e., Xc = X and Xg = φ.
Observe that, when X = Xc,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|X)
≤ Uni(Z,UX : Yˆ |X)
≤ I(Z,UX ; Yˆ | X) [(3) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID terms]
= H(Yˆ | X)−H(Yˆ | Z,UX , X) [By Definition]
= 0. [Yˆ is a deterministic function of X] (37)
Property 4 (Zero Influence). MNE should be 0 if CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0 (or equivalently, I(Z; Yˆ , UX) = 0).
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc)
≤ Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc)
≤ I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)). [(2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID terms] (38)
Thus, I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 0 implies MNE = 0.
Property 5 (Non-Exempt Statistically Visible Bias). MNE should be strictly greater than 0 if Yˆ has any unique information
about Z. Thus, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 should imply that MNE > 0.
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc)
= Uni((Z,U∗a ) : (Yˆ , U
∗
b )|Xc) [for some (U∗a , U∗b )]
≥ Uni(Z : (Yˆ , U∗b )|Xc) [Using Lemma 9]
≥ Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc). [Using Lemma 10] (39)
Thus, Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 implies that MNE > 0.
Property 6 (Non-Exempt Masked Bias). MNE should be non-zero in Example 3, the canonical example of non-exempt masked
bias. However, MNE should be 0 if (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) form a Markov chain for some subsets Ua, Ub ⊆ UX such that
Ua = UX\Ub.
First we will show that M∗NE > 0 for the canonical example of non-exempt bias where Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 where Z lies in the
non-critical/general features and UX1 can be either critical or non-critical.
Case 1: Xc = UX1 , Xg = Z and Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 with Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
We will check the value of Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) for different choices of Ua to find the minimum.
For Ua = φ and Ub = UX1 , we have
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX1)|Xc) [Substituting the variables]
= I(Z; (Yˆ , UX1))− Red(Z : ((Yˆ , UX1), Xc)) [Using (2) in Section II-A]
(a)
= I(Z; (Yˆ , UX1))
= 1 bit. (40)
Here (a) holds because Red(Z : ((Yˆ , UX1), Xc)) ≤ I(Z;Xc) (using (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID terms), and
here I(Z;Xc) = 0.
For Ua = UX1 and Ub = φ, we have
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX1) : Yˆ |Xc) [Substituting the variables]
= I((Z,UX1); Yˆ | Xc) [Lemma 14 as Yˆ is deterministic function of f(Z,UX1)]
= 1 bit. (41)
Thus,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 1 bit,
which is strictly greater than 0.
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Case 2: Xc = φ, Xg = (Z,UX1) and Yˆ = Z ⊕ UX1 with Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
Since Xc = φ, we can use Property 1 (proved above) to compute
M∗NE = I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = 1 bit,
which is strictly greater than 0. Thus, our proposed measure is non-zero in the canonical example of non-exempt masked bias.
Now, we move on to the proof of the next part of this property.
Suppose that (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) form a Markov chain for some subsets Ua, Ub ⊆ UX such that Ua = UX\Ub. Then,
I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) = 0, implying that Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 0 for those subsets Ua, Ub ⊆ UX because unique
information is a sub-component of conditional mutual information. Therefore,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) ≤ 0.
Again, using the fact that unique information is non-negative, we have,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) ≥ 0.
Thus, M∗NE = 0.
Lemma 2. The Markov chain (Z,Ua)−Xc − (Yˆ , Ub) implies that the following Markov chains also hold: (i) Z −Xc − Yˆ ;
(ii) (Z,Ua)−Xc − Yˆ ; and (ii) Z −Xc − (Yˆ , Ub).
Proof of Lemma 2. We note that the terms I(Z; Yˆ | Xc), I(Z; (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) and I((Z,Ua); Yˆ | Xc) are all less than or equal
to I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) using the chain rule and non-negativity of conditional mutual information.
Thus, if I((Z,Ua); (Yˆ , Ub) | Xc) = 0, then all those three terms are also 0.
B. Supporting Derivations
Here, we include the supporting derivations for some of our statements in Section III-A and Section III-B.
Supporting Derivation 1: Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 for Example 5 (discrimination in admissions).
Proof. Recall that for this example, Xc = UX1 , Xg = Z ⊕UX2 , and Yˆ = UX1 +Z +UX2 with Z,UX1 , UX2 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
The claim can be verified as follows:
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = I(Z; Yˆ )− Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) [using (2) in Section II-A]
(a)
≥ I(Z; Yˆ )− I(Z;Xc)
(b)
= I(Z; Yˆ )
(c)
> 0,
where (a) holds because Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) ≤ I(Z;Xc) (using (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of all PID terms) and (b)
holds because I(Z;Xc) = 0. Lastly, (c) holds because Yˆ and Z are not independent of each other for this specific example.
Supporting Derivation 2: Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0 for Counterexample 3 (discrimination by unmasking).
Proof. Recall that for this example, Xc = Z ⊕ UX1 , Xg = UX1 and Yˆ = Z with Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
The claim can be verified as follows:
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = I(Z; Yˆ )− Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) [using (2) in Section II-A]
(a)
≥ I(Z; Yˆ )− I(Z;Xc)
(b)
= 1 bit,
where (a) holds because Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) ≤ I(Z;Xc) (using (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of all PID terms) and (b)
holds because I(Z;Xc) = 0.
Supporting Derivation 3: Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) > 0 in Counterexample 4 and Example 4.
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Proof. First consider Counterexample 4.
Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Z + UX1 , UX)|Z + UX1) [Substituting the variables]
(a)
≥ Uni(Z : Z|Z + UX1)
(b)
= I(Z;Z | Z + UX1)
(c)
> 0.
Here, (a) holds because Z is a deterministic function of (Z + UX1 , UX) and unique information is non-increasing under local
operations of B (see Lemma 10 in Appendix B). Next, (b) holds because if we consider ∆p, the set of joint distributions of
(Z,Z,Z + UX1), such that the marginals (Z,Z) and (Z,Z + UX1) are the same as the marginals of the true joint distribution,
we find that there is only one distribution in this set, which is exactly the true distribution. Thus, Uni(Z : Z|Z + UX1) =
minQ∈∆p IQ(Z;Z | Z + UX1) = I(Z;Z | Z + UX1). Lastly (c) holds because,
I(Z;Z | Z + UX1) = H(Z|Z + UX1)−H(Z|Z,Z + UX1) = H(Z|Z + UX1) =
∑
t=0,1,2
H(Z|Z + UX1 = t) Pr(Z + UX1=t).
Using the fact that Z,UX1 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2), we can compute H(Z|Z +UX1 = 0) = 0, H(Z|Z +UX1 = 1) = hb(1/2) = 1, and
H(Z|Z + UX1 = 2) = 0. Here, hb(·) is the binary entropy function [79] given by hb(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p).
Also note that, Pr(Z + UX1 = 1) = 1/2. So, I(Z;Z | Z + UX1) = 0.5 bits.
Next, consider Example 4. The derivation is similar as above because Z can be obtained from local operations on (Yˆ , UX).
Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Z + UX1 + UX2 , UX)|Z + UX1) [Substituting the variables]
≥ Uni(Z : Z|Z + UX1)
= I(Z;Z | Z + UX1) > 0.
Supporting Derivation 4: Exact computation of Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) and M∗NE for Example 5.
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) (a)= I(Z; Yˆ )
= H(Z)−H(Z|Yˆ )
= H(Z)−H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2)
= H(Z)−
∑
t=0,1,2,3
H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2 = t) Pr(UX1 + Z + UX2 = t)
(b)
= 1− 3/4hb(1/3) bits. (42)
Here (a) holds because I(Z;UX1) = 0, implying Red(Z : (Yˆ , UX1)) = 0 as well (using (2) in Section II-A and non-negativity of
PID terms). Lastly, (b) holds because Z,UX1 , UX2 ∼ i.i.d. Bern(1/2). So, we can exactly compute H(Z|UX1 +Z+UX2 = 0) = 0,
H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2 = 1) = hb(1/3), H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2 = 2) = hb(1/3), and H(Z|UX1 + Z + UX2 = 3) = 0. Here, hb(·)
is the binary entropy function [79] given by hb(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p). Also note that, Pr(UX1 + Z + UX2 =
1) = Pr(UX1 + Z + UX2 = 2) = 3/8.
Now, we will examine the value of Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) for different choices of Ua to find the minimum.
Let Ua = φ (and Ub = UX ). Then,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX1 , UX2)|UX1)
(a)
= I(Z;UX1 + Z + UX2 , UX1 , UX2)
= I(Z;UX1 , UX2) + I(Z;UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , UX2) [Chain Rule]
= I(Z;UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , UX2) [Z is independent of UX1 , UX2 ]
= H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , UX2)−H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | Z,UX1 , UX2) [By Definition]
= H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , UX2) [Deterministic Function]
=
∑
u1,u2∈{0,1}
H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 = u1, UX2 = u2) Pr(UX1 = u1, UX2 = u2)
=
∑
u1,u2∈{0,1}
hb(1/2) Pr(UX1 = u1, UX2 = u2)
= 1 bit. (43)
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Here (a) holds again because I(Z;UX1) = 0, implying the redundant information is 0 as well (using (2) in Section II-A).
Next, for Ua = UX2 (and Ub = UX1 ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX2) : (Yˆ , UX1)|UX1)
(a)
= I((Z,UX2); (Yˆ , UX1))
= I((Z,UX2);UX1) + I((Z,UX2); Yˆ | UX1) [Chain Rule]
= I((Z,UX2); Yˆ | UX1) [Z,UX2 is independent of UX1 ]
= H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1)−H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , (Z,UX2)) [By Definition]
= H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1) [Deterministic Function]
=
∑
u1=0,1
H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 = u1) Pr(UX1 = u1)
= 1/4 log2 4 + 1/2 log2 2 + 1/4 log2 4
= 3/2 bit. (44)
Here (a) holds again because I((Z,UX2);UX1) = 0, implying the redundant information is 0 as well (using (2) in Section II-A).
Next, for Ua = UX1 (and Ub = UX2 ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX1) : (Yˆ , UX2)|UX1)
(b)
= I((Z,UX1); (Yˆ , UX2) | UX1)
= I((Z,UX1);UX2 | UX1) + I((Z,UX1); Yˆ | UX1 , UX2) [Chain Rule]
= I((Z,UX1); Yˆ | UX1 , UX2) [Mutual Independence]
= H(Yˆ | UX1 , UX2)−H(Yˆ | (Z,UX1), UX1 , UX2) [By Definition]
= H(Yˆ | UX1 , UX2) [Deterministic Function]
= H(UX1 + Z + UX2 | UX1 , UX2)
= 1 bit. (45)
Here (b) holds because Syn((Z,UX1) : (A,B)) = 0 if one of the terms A or B is a deterministic function of (Z,UX1) (using
Lemma 14 in Appendix B) and hence unique information becomes equal to the conditional mutual information (see (3) in
Section II-A).
Lastly, for Ua = UX (and Ub = φ), we have,
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = Uni((Z,UX1 , UX2) : Yˆ |UX1)
(b)
= I((Z,UX1 , UX2); Yˆ | UX1)
= H(Yˆ | UX1)−H(Yˆ | (Z,UX1 , UX2), UX1) [By Definition]
= H(Yˆ | UX1) [Deterministic Function]
= 1/4 log2 4 + 1/2 log2 2 + 1/4 log2 4
= 3/2 bit. (46)
Here (b) holds again using Lemma 14 in Appendix B.
Thus, we obtain that,
M∗NE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) = 1 bit.
This is strictly greater than Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 1 − 34hb(1/3) bits, accounting for both non-exempt statistically visible and
non-exempt masked biases.
C. Discussion on Other Candidate Measures
Why the product of the two measures I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) and I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) does not work?
One might recall that the measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) resolved most of the examples except in Counterexample 1 where the output
Yˆ had no counterfactual causal influence of Z and yet this measure gave a false positive conclusion about non-exempt bias.
This leads us to examine another candidate measure, i.e., product of I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) and I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) where the latter is always
0 whenever there is no counterfactual causal influence of Z on Yˆ .
Candidate Measure 5. MNE = I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)× I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)).
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Counterexample 5. Let Z = (Z1, Z2), Xc = (Z1 ⊕ UX1 , Z2), Xg = (Z1, UX2) and Yˆ = (UX1 , Z2 ⊕ UX2) where
Z1, Z2, UX1 , UX2 are i.i.d. Bern(1/2).
This example should be exempt because Z2 already appears in Xc, and is hence exempt. However, both I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) and
I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) are non-zero for this example. This leads us to examine another candidate measure, which is essentially the
common information-theoretic volume between I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc), i.e., a measure of the common reason that can
make both I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) > 0 and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0 (overlapping volume).
Measure proposed in [1]: Information-theoretic sub-volume of the intersection between I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) and I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)):
The previous counterexample demonstrates that both these measures I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) and I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) can be non-zero for
different reasons leading to a false positive conclusion using Candidate Measure 5. Intuitively, we need to identify the common
reason that makes them non-zero, if any. This motivates us to examine another candidate (Candidate Measure 6) which is the
information-theoretic sub-volume of the intersection between these two measures, as shown in Fig. 13.
Candidate Measure 6. MNE = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc)−Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|(Xc, Yˆ )).
I 𝑍; (𝑌&, 𝑈!) I 𝑍; 𝑌&|𝑋"
I 𝑍; 𝑋"
𝑀#$
I 𝑍; (𝑌&, 𝑋") I 𝑍; (𝑌&, 𝑈!)
I 𝑍; 𝑋"
R1
I 𝑍; (𝑌&, 𝑈!)
R2
I 𝑍; (𝑌&, 𝑋")
Fig. 13: (Left) Notice that the blue full-circle denotes I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) and the red full-circle denotes I(Z; (Yˆ , Xc)). The term
I(Z; (Yˆ , Xc)) is equal to the sum of I(Z;Xc) (green half-circle) and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) (orange half-circle). The candidate measure
(MNE) is the intersecting volume between I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) and I(Z; Yˆ | Xc). Next, we show pictorially that this intersecting
volume is given by R1−R2 where R1 is shown in the middle figure and R2 is shown in the rightmost figure. (Middle) Notice
that R1 = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc). (Right) Notice that R2 = Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|(Yˆ , Xc)).
Limitations of Candidate Measure 6: This measure does resolve many of the examples and satisfies several desirable properties
(discussed more in [1]). However, it fails to capture certain types of non-exempt masked bias when the mask arises from Xg ,
e.g., scenarios like Example 6 in Section III-B, where non-exempt masked bias is present even though Z −Xc − Yˆ form a
Markov chain.
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX TO SECTION IV
A. Proof of Theorem 2 and Lemma 3
Theorem 2 (Non-negative Decomposition of Total Bias). The total bias can be decomposed into four components as follows:
I(Z; (Yˆ , UX)) = MV,NE +MV,E +MM,NE +MM,E . (11)
Here MV,NE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) and MV,E = Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)). These two terms add to form I(Z; Yˆ ) which is the total
statistically visible bias. Next, MM,NE = M∗NE−MV,NE where M∗NE is our proposed measure of non-exempt bias (Definition 7),
and MM,E = I(Z; Yˆ , UX)− I(Z; Yˆ )−MM,NE . All of these components are non-negative.
Proof of Theorem 2. First consider MV,NE = Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) and MV,E = Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)). Because all PID terms are
non-negative by definition, both MV,NE and MV,E are non-negative.
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Now, consider MM,E . Observe that,
MM,E = I(Z; (Yˆ , UX))− I(Z; Yˆ )−MM,NE [By Definition]
= I(Z; Yˆ ) + I(Z;UX | Yˆ )− I(Z; Yˆ )−MM,NE [Chain Rule for mutual information]
= I(Z;UX | Yˆ )−MM,NE
= I(Z;UX | Yˆ )−M∗NE +MV,NE [By Definition]
= I(Z;UX | Yˆ )− min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc) + Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) [By Definition]
≥ I(Z;UX | Yˆ )−Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Xc) + Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)
≥ I(Z;UX | Yˆ )−Uni(Z : (Yˆ , UX)|Yˆ ) [Triangle Inequality (Lemma 8)]
≥ I(Z;UX | Yˆ )− I(Z; (Yˆ , UX) | Yˆ ) [(3) in Section II-A]
= I(Z;UX | Yˆ )− I(Z;UX | Yˆ )− I(Z; Yˆ | UX , Yˆ ) [Chain Rule for mutual information]
= 0. (47)
Lastly, we consider MM,NE = minUa,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc)−Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc).
MNE = min
Ua,Ub s.t. Ua=UX\Ub
Uni((Z,Ua) : (Yˆ , Ub)|Xc)−Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)
= Uni((Z,U∗a ) : (Yˆ , U
∗
b )|Xc)−Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) [for some (U∗a , U∗b )]
≥ Uni(Z : (Yˆ , U∗b )|Xc)−Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) [Using Lemma 9]
≥ Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)−Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) [Using Lemma 10]
= 0. (48)
Lemma 3 (Conditioning to Capture Masked Bias). The following two statements are equivalent:
• Masked bias I(Z; (Yˆ , UX))− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0.
• ∃ a random variable G of the form G = g(UX) such that I(Z; Yˆ | G)− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Before proceeding, note that, I(Z; Yˆ , UX) = I(Z;UX) + I(Z; Yˆ | UX) = I(Z; Yˆ | UX) because Z is
independent of UX . This also leads to the masked bias being equal to I(Z; Yˆ | UX)− I(Z; Yˆ ).
First, we show that the first statement implies the second statement. Suppose that, masked bias I(Z; Yˆ | UX)− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0.
Then, we can choose the function G = UX such that I(Z; Yˆ | G)− I(Z; Yˆ ) > 0. Thus, the implication holds.
We will now show that the second statement also implies the first statement. First note that, using Lemma 12, for any
deterministic g(·), we always have I(Z; Yˆ | UX) ≥ I(Z; Yˆ | g(UX)). Now, suppose there exists a G = g(UX) such that
I(Z; Yˆ | G) > I(Z; Yˆ ). Then, I(Z; Yˆ | UX) ≥ I(Z; Yˆ | g(UX)) > I(Z; Yˆ ), implying masked bias is present.
Thus, we prove that the first and second statements are equivalent.
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX TO SECTION VI
Lemma 4. [Fairness Properties of Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc)] The measure Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) satisfies Properties 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Proof of Lemma 4. Property 2 is satisfied using Lemma 11 in Appendix B (originally derived in [73, Lemma 32]).
Property 3 is satisfied because Yˆ is a deterministic function of the entire X , and hence the Markov chain Z −X − Yˆ holds.
Thus I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) = 0, also implying Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0.
Property 5 is trivially satisfied because the property itself requires that Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0.
For Property 4, observe that,
CCI(Z → Yˆ ) = 0
=⇒ I(Z; Yˆ ) = 0
=⇒ Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) + Red(Z : (Yˆ , Xc)) = 0 [Using (2) in Section II-A]
=⇒ Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) = 0 [Non-negativity of PID terms]. (49)
Lemma 5. [Fairness Properties of I(Z; Yˆ | Xc)] The measure I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) satisfies Properties 3 and 5.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Property 3 is satisfied because Yˆ is a deterministic function of the entire X , and hence the Markov chain
Z −X − Yˆ holds.
For Property 5, observe that
Uni(Z : Yˆ |Xc) > 0
=⇒ I(Z; Yˆ | Xc) > 0 [Using (3) in Section II-A and non-negativity of PID terms]. (50)
